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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code § 78A-4-
l 03(2)( e ). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Four issues are presented challenging the convictions themselves. A fifth 
~ issue is raised regarding the trial court's interpretation of Utah's restitution statute. 
Issues relating to the conviction 
ISSUE I: The defendant was a manager of a Utah limited liability company 
(LLC). By law, the authority of an LLC manager is prescribed by the LLC's written 
Operating Agreement and the LLC Act, interpretation of which are questions of law. 
The trial court ruled that interpretation of an operating agreement is a question for the 
jury in a criminal case. The court also permitted the jury to give the operating 
agreement whatever weight it wished in determining the manager's authority, and did 
not instruct the jury on contract interpretation or the LLC Act. The question for 
v; review is whether a new trial should be granted due to these errors. 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a contract is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness, as is the interpretation of case law and of a statute. Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, ,I 19, 258 P.3d 539. If the 
Court is required to find manifest injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of 
counsel on this issue, those issues are reviewed de nova. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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15, ,r 11, 328 P.3d 841; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. 
Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,r 4, 46 P.3d 230; Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). 
Preservation: Didericksen's contention that interpretation of the 
LLC's operating agreement was an issue of law for the court was preserved. (E.g., 
R.1515, p. 4:4-23; R.1521, pp. 194-195:22-6; R. 984; R.1382; R.1443.) Trial 
counsel did not specifically request the court to interpret the LLC Act. However, 
such a request would have been similar to the request to construe the LLC' s 
operating agreement and would have been futile in light of the court's rulings on the 
latter. Additionally, the issue can be reached under the doctrines of manifest 
injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, ,I 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,r 4, 46 P.3d 230; Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(e). 
Trial counsel did not object to the court's failure to instruct the jury on any 
principles of law relating to contract interpretation or Utah's LLC Act. Counsel 
averred that he did not request contract-related instructions because he believed 
that an agreement had been reached with the State that the Operating Agreement 
would be interpreted by the court as a matter of law post-verdict. (R.1383.) As 
discussed below, either counsel's belief was unreasonable or the State unfairly 
induced counsel's reliance. Either way, the jury instructions can be reached under 
the doctrines of manifest injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel. 
2 
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State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,r 4, 46 
~ 
vQ 
P.3d 230; Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). 
ISSUE II: The alleged victims had (at most) a 25 percent profits interest in 
the LLC. The remaining interest belonged to Didericksen and his co-defendant 
Bruun. The "value" of property under the theft statute is limited to the victim's legal 
interest in the property. The trial court allowed the State to charge 100 percent of the 
face value of the 12 checks at issue, rather than the victims' 25 percent. Had the trial 
court correctly applied the law, all but four of the counts would have been chargeable 
only as misdemeanors and therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The issue on 
appeal is whether those counts should have been dismissed as a matter of law. 
Standard of review: This issue involves interpretation of a statute (i.e., 
the theft statute), and of a written, integrated Operating Agreement. Both are 
questions of law. (See cases cited in Issue I.) If the Court is required to find manifest 
injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue, those issues 
are reviewed de nova. (See cases cited in Issue I.) 
Preservation: Didericksen's contention that the value of the property 
allegedly stolen was limited to the alleged victims' interest in the property, and that 
all but four of the theft counts were therefore chargeable only as misdemeanors, was 
preserved. (R.163-164; R. 233-235; R. 985; R.1514, p. 12:2-18; R.1515, pp. 4-5:4-3, 
andpp.12-13:21-3; R.1523,pp.178-180.) 
~ 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Because the lower court ruled against Didericksen on these threshold legal 
issues and allowed the State to pursue the counts as felonies, there was no procedural 
opportunity, and it would have been futile, to seek dismissal of the charges under the 
two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors. Given this procedural background, 
the statute of limitations was adequately preserved. If it were not, however, the 
failure to raise a valid statute of limitations defense could be reviewed under the 
doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel or manifest injustice. State v. McCloud, 
2005 UT App 466, ,r 5, 126 P.3d 775, cert. denied, 133 P.3d 437 (Utah 2006). 
ISSUE ill: By statute, wrongful appropriation is a lesser-included offense of 
theft. The jury was not instructed on wrongful appropriation, and it was not included 
on the verdict form. The issue for review is whether the defendant should receive a 
new trial because the court failed to instruct the jury as to this lesser included offense. 
Standard of review: Claims of erroneous jury instructions present 
questions of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ,I 16, 243 P.3d 
1250; State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). If the Court is 
required to find manifest injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel on 
this issue, those issues are reviewed de nova. (See cases cited in Issue I.) 
Preservation: Trial counsel did not object to the court's failure to 
instruct on wrongful appropriation. However, as discussed below (pp. 44-47), 
counsel forwent such instruction pursuant to what he believed was an agreement with 
4 
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the State. Apart from whether the State unfairly induced reliance by trial counsel, the 
jury instructions and verdict form can be reached under the doctrines of manifest 
injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, ,I 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,I 4, 46 P.3d 230; Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(e). 
ISSUE IV: The defendant was convicted of a violation of the Utah Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act, which requires that the predicate offenses occur over a 
"substantial period of time." 
A. The trial court did not instruct the jury that the activities must have 
occurred over a substantial period of time. Additionally, as a matter of law the period 
of time alleged in the Information was insufficient to satisfy that element. The issue 
on appeal is whether the case should be reversed with direction to dismiss the 
UPUAA count due to an insufficient period of time, or whether defendant should be 
granted a new trial due to the deficient jury instructions. 
B. If the convictions are reversed due to the failure to instruct on the 
lesser included offense of wrongful appropriation (see Issue III), the issue on appeal 
is whether the defendant should receive a new trial on the UPUAA count because 
wrongful appropriation is not a predicate offense under the Act. 
Standard of review: Claims of erroneous jury instructions present 
questions of law reviewed for correctness. See cases cited in Issue III. If the Court is 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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required to find manifest injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel on 
this issue, those issues are reviewed de nova. See cases cited in Issue I. 
Preservation: Trial counsel did not object to the trial court's failure to 
instruct the jury on the element of substantial period of time, or move the court to 
dismiss the UPUAA count due to insufficiency of the period alleged. However, 
failure to give an elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice 
standard under Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) and constitutes reversible error as a matter of 
law. State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). These issues can 
also be reached under the doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel or plain error. 
See pp. 52-53, infra. 
Issue relating to restitution 
ISSUE V: The trial court ordered Didericksen to pay restitution to the Poseys 
of$189,574.33. (R.1377.) This amount represented the total face amount of the 12 
checks for which Didericksen was convicted of theft. 
a) Prior to charges being filed, the Poseys had accepted full 
compensation for all potential claims relating to those checks. The issue for review is 
whether the trial co~ was required to take into account compensation previously 
received by the victims when determining complete or court-ordered restitution. 
b) Restitution cannot exceed the victim's actual damages caused by 
the defendant's actions for which the defendant was convicted. As described in Issue 
6 
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II, the maximum pecuniary loss caused to the Poseys from the alleged theft of LLC 
funds was their 25% interest in those funds. The issue for review is whether the court 
erred in interpreting the restitution statute as allowing restitution based on the face 
~ value (100 percent) of the checks, rather than the Poseys' actual loss. 
Standard of review: A trial court's interpretation of the restitution 
~ statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Birkeland, 2011 UT 
App 227, ,r 7,258 P.3d 662. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved. See R.1077 and preservation 
cites in Issue IL 
Cumulative error 
ISSUE VI: The final issue for review is whether the cumulative errors in the 
case require reversal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code §§ 48-2c-803 and -804 (LLC Act), 76-1-302 (Time limitations for 
prosecution of offenses ... Commencement of prosecution), 76-6-404.5 (Wrongful 
appropriation-penalties), 77-17-10 (Court to determine law), and 77-38a-102(6) 
and 77-38a-302(1) and (2) (Restitution Criteria) are set forth in Addendum Exh. C. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
As described more fully below, the defendant J runes Didericksen ( and a 
second defendant, Allen Bruun) were managers of a limited liability company. The 
alleged victims, Kerry R. Posey and Bobbie M. Posey, were members of the LLC. 
The State charged Didericksen ( and Bruun) with 28 counts of theft m 
connection with 28 checks written by them from the LLC's bank account, plus one 
count of a pattern of unlawful activity. (R.69.) 
Prior to trial, the defendants filed various motions or objections asking the 
court to interpret the written Operating Agreement under which the defendants 
managed the LLC. (See, e.g., R.98-99, 101, 107-110, 113, 117, 163-164, 224-236.)1 
The trial court denied the motions, and the case proceeded to trial in 
November 2013. The defendants moved to dismiss at the end of the State's case in 
chief, which motion was denied. (R.1535, pp. 178-181.) During trial, the State 
voluntarily dismissed two counts. (R.1536, pp. 207-209.) Of the remaining counts, 
1 The defendants also filed a motion for bill of particulars, asking that the State be 
required to identify what portions of the Operating Agreement were allegedly 
violated. (R.162-163.) The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the State was 
not required to identify a legal theory. (R.1514 and id., p. 9:5-11 ("Well, don't you 
generally look - if somebody says you're in violation of Title 76 don't you 
generally look at what your client did and then you can kind of decide whether he 
murdered somebody, or whether he took drugs, or whatever it was ... ?").) 
8 
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the jury found the defendants guilty on 12 counts of theft (2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 19, 21, 
22, 24, and 28), and on the single Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act count (29). 
(R.971-973.) The defendants filed a motion for new trial (R.1193), which was 
~ denied. (R.14 73.) 
The trial court sentenced the defendant to prison, but suspended the sentence 
and ordered probation. As part of the probation, Didericksen was ordered to serve 
one year in the Salt Lake County jail commencing forthwith. (R.1107.) 
The court also ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the Poseys in the 
amount of $189,574.33. (R.1377.) Didericksen separately appealed both the order of 
restitution and the conviction. (R.1378; R.1475.) The restitution and conviction 
appeals were consolidated by the Court into the above-captioned case. 
Statement of facts 
In 2007, a Utah limited liability company called Tivoli Properties, LLC, was 
formed. (Deft's Exh. 29, p. 20, and R.1534 (State stipulating to defendants' 
exhibit).) The LLC was governed by a written Operating Agreement signed by all 
three of the LLC's members: Equity Partners, LLC, ~anager/Member, Kerry R. 
Posey, Member, and Bobbie M. Posey, Member. Id. For the Court's convenience, a 
copy ofTivoli's Operating Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum Exh. D.2 
vJ) 2 The managing member, Equity Partners, LLC, had a single member, Four Winds 
Development Group, LLC. Defendants Didericksen and Bruun were managing 
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The Operating Agreement provided that Kerry and Bobbie Posey had a 
combined sharing interest in Tivoli of 25 percent. The remaining 75 percent interest 
belonged to Equity Partners (i.e., Didericksen and Bruun). (See Add. Exh. D, §§ 
1.2.12 ("'Membership Interest' or 'Interest' means a Member's percentage interest in 
the Company, consisting of the Member's right to share in Profits, receive 
distributions, participate in the Company's governance, approve the Company's acts, 
participate in the designation and removal of a Manager, and receive information 
pertaining to the Company's affairs. The Membership Interests of the Initial 
Members [Equity, Posey and Posey] are set forth in Article 3.3.") and § 3.3 ("[T]he 
initial Sharing Ratio of Equity Partners is 7 5%, and the initial Sharing Ratio of Kerry 
R. and Bobbie M. Posey is 12.5% each"). See also Utah Code§ 48-2c-906 (profits 
of an LLC "shall be allocated among the members in the manner provided in the 
operating agreement"). 3 
members of Four Winds. (R. 84; State's Exh. 14 and 19.) As a result, Didericksen 
and Bruun were the managers of both the Equity Partners and Tivoli LLCs. 
3 In a later addendum, Equity and the Poseys agreed to a slight adjustment of their 
capital accounts which reduced the Poseys' percentage to 23.8%. See Add. Exh. 
D, Deft's Exh. 29. Because it is immaterial to resolution of the issues on appeal 
and Section 3.3 of the operating agreement was not expressly amended in the 
addendum, Didericksen uses the stated percentages from Section 3.3 (75/12.5/12.5) 
herein. 
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The funds in Tivoli's bank account came from a hard money loan taken out by 
Equity Partners, personally guaranteed by Bruun and Didericksen. The loan was for 
the purchase of 29 acres of land in Saratoga Springs owned by the Poseys, which 
~ Equity bought from the Poseys. (R.1534, pp. 287-289:12-6.) Equity used the 29 
acres as security for the hard money loan, and assigned its rights in the property to 
Tivoli. Id. 
From the hard money loan, a portion was used to pay off the underlying 
mortgage on the purchased property, and the remainder was placed in Tivoli's bank 
account. The State's investigator and expert witness confirmed that the funds were 
placed in Tivoli' s account, that they were Tivoli' s money at that point, and that the 
Poseys' interest in the funds at that point was in their capacity as members of the 
Tivoli LLC. (R.1535, pp. 67-69:20-1.))4 
Under the Operating Agreement, Tivoli agreed to pay the Poseys $10,000 
monthly from the operating capital of the LLC. (Add. Exh. D, p. 5, § 3.1.1.) 
Between December 21, 2007, and April 11, 2008, Didericksen signed 11 
checks ( ~ong others) drawn from Tivoli' s bank account. One additional check was 
signed on September 4, 2008, for $983.81. (State's Exh. 4 (checks) and R. 971-972 
4 The State's theory throughout the case was that the money was obtained lawfully, 
~ and then later misappropriated. (R. 86 (State's Memorandum of Probable Cause).) 
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(verdict).) These are the checks for which the jury found Didericksen guilty of theft. 
Id 
The State contended, and the defendants agreed, that most of these disputed 
checks went in some way toward development of a project called Hidden Acres, 
which was being developed by an affiliated entity, Hidden Acres, LLC. (E.g., 
Checks 1007 ("lot closing Hidden Acres Lot #2"), 1015 ( dump fee), 1029 
(landscaping), 1098 ( dirt removal)5.) 
With respect to the disputed checks, Kerry Posey and Bobbie Posey testified 
that they were not asked about nor consented to the checks, that the defendants' 
actions were contrary to oral discussions they had had with the defendants, and that 
the use of the funds was contrary to the LLC purpose. (E.g., R.1554, pp. 147-148, 
160, 163-167; R.1533, pp. 78-79, 85-86, 146-147, 160-163, and 227-228.) 
Equity Partners (through Didericksen and Bruun) had executed a joint venture 
agreement between Tivoli and Hidden Acres, LLC with respect to the Hidden Acres 
development. (R.1535, p. 213:4-7.) While the Poseys acknowledged visiting the 
Hidden Acres development site with the defendants multiple times (R.1520, pp. 3 8-
39: 17-25; R.1533, pp. 135-136:3-8), they averred that they did not consent, and 
5 Some of this construction work was performed by other companies of which Bruun 
or Didericksen were principals. (E.g., State's Exh. 13, 15, 18 (U. S. General 
Construction Group, LLC, Construction Advisers, LLC, Granite Builders, LLC, 
Hidden Acres, LLC).) 
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would not have consented, to Tivoli's entry into a joint venture on the Hidden Acres 
project. (R.1520, p. 34:6-24.) 
Provisions o/Lhe Tivoli Operating Agreement 
The LLC's Operating Agreement began with a recitation of the members' 
intent to "appoint a person or persons to assume responsibility for certain 
management matters (the 'Manager')," and to "provide for the restriction on the 
transfers of ownership interests in the Company ('Interests')[.]" (Add. Exh. D, p. 1.) 
"Manager" was defined as "a Person, Persons or Committee, whether or not 
consisting of a Member, Members or not, who is vested with authority to manage the 
Company in accordance with Article VII." Id.,§ 1.2.10. 
Article VII, in tum, provided: 
7. I. Business of the Company. (a) Equity Partners, LLC ("EP") shall 
have full, exclusive and complete authority and discretion in the management 
and control of the business of the Company for the purposes stated herein and 
shall make all decisions affecting the business of the Company. A[ s] such, any 
action taken shall constitute the act of, and serve to bind, the Company. EP 
shall manage and control the affairs of the Company to the best of its ability 
and shall use its best efforts to carry out the business of the Company and will 
be compensated for providing various services .... 
(Add. Exh. D, p. 12.) 
The manager's authority was further described in Section 7.4, General Powers 
of Managers, which included authority to: 
7.4.l Purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire any real or personal 
property; Sell, convey, mortgage, grant a security interest in, pledge, lease, 
exchange, or otherwise dispose or encumber any real or personal property; 
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7.4.2 Open one or more depository accounts and make deposits into, 
and write checks and withdrawals against such accounts ... ; 
7.4.7 Participate with others in partnerships, joint ventures, and other 
associations and strategic alliances only where same are directly in pursuit of 
the Business, as defined above. 
(A<l<l. Exh. D, p. 13.) 
Section 7.4.7.1 included a limitation on the manager's authority: 
There is an express limitation on the nature of the Business and the powers 
granted the Managers herein, the Company is intended to purchase and 
develop, hold and sale [sic J real estate for investment purposes only, and no 
activities inconsistent with such limited purposes shall be undertaken. 
(Add. Exh. D, p. 14.) 
Article 9 .1 authorized Tivoli to make payments to affiliated entities: 
Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement may be engaged to perform services 
for the Company. The validity of any transaction, agreement or payment 
involving the Company and any affiliates of the parties to this Agreement 
otherwise permitted by the terms of this Agreement shall not be affected by 
reason of the relationship between them and such Affiliates or the approval of 
said transactions, agreement or payment. 
(Add. Exh. D., p. 16.) 
The Operating Agreement conferred authority on Tivoli' s managers to resolve 
disputes in its interpretation. See Add. Exh. D, p. 8, § 5.3.5 ("Any questions 
regarding the conduct of the Company business shall be determined by a vote of 
100% of the Managing Members of the Company.") and p. 18, § 12.6 ("In every 
instance where agreement between the members does not exist with reference to the 
policies to be followed by the company, the managing members shall have the right 
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to decide what policy or policies shall be followed and the other member or members 
shall consider the decision as final."). 
The Operating Agreement contained an integration clause: 
This Agreement embodies the entire understanding and agreement among the 
parties concerning the Company and supersedes any and all prior negotiations, 
understandings or agreements in regard thereto. 
(Add. Exh. D, p. 19, § 12.10.) 
Prior to trial, the defendants asked the trial court to interpret the Operating 
Agreement, both with respect to its provisions regarding managers' authority and the 
degree of the Poseys' interest in the LLC. (E.g., R.98, 99, 101, 107, 108, 109, 110, 
113, 117, 163, 164, 224-236.) 
The initial judge on the case (the Hon. Randall K. Skanchy) had previously 
interpreted one portion of the Operating Agreement as a matter of law. Judge 
VJI Skanchy had concluded that a section requiring "Members" to obtain consent for 
expenditures exceeding $500 applied only to persons acting in their capacity as 
members, not to "Managers." (R.146 n.1. )6 
6 Judge Skanchy wrote: "The defendants make much of Mr. Posey's preliminary 
hearing testimony that he believed each expenditure made by defendants over the 
amount of $500 violated the Operating Agreement because that document limited 
expenses over $500 unless by unanimous consent. In fact, the Operating 
Agreement imposed that limitation only on 'members' of Tivoli Properties, such as 
Mr. Posey and Ms. Posey, but it does not apply to managers such as the 
defendants. The Court determines that Mr. Posey's testimony as to defendants' 
breach of the Operating Agreement in this manner is not asserted by the State as a 
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A successor judge (the Hon. Katie Bernards-Goodman), however, ruled that 
interpretation of the Operating Agreement was for the jury. The court accepted the 
State's argument that interpretation of an LLC's operating agreement in a criminal 
case is for the jury, not the court. (E.g., R.1514, p. 13:1-8 (Court: "This isn't a civil 
case."); R.1535, p. 180:5-7 (Court: "[D]espite what percentages are written in the 
contract, we are here talking about criminal matters."); id., p. 194:12-21 (State: "It's 
up to the jury to decide what the operating agreement means. The jury's not bound 
by this operating agreement.").) The Operating Agreement was given to jurors as an 
exhibit to give whatever weight they thought it deserved. (R.1444.) 
As a consequence, much of the trial was consumed with witnesses reading 
aloud, and then offering their interpretations of, various language in the Operating 
Agreement. (See, e.g., R.1533, pp. 147-151, 154-156, 158-161, 190-193, 207-213, 
260, 265-266; R.1534, pp. 4-10, 49-51, 121-126, 220-222, 264-265, 279-282; 
R.1535, pp. 70-71, 108-121, 125-137, 141-142, 146-148, 158-167, 176-177, 264-
271, 282-283, 299-301, 304-307, 314-315, 331-332.) 
Under the court's ruling, the State was allowed to argue that the defendants 
lacked authority because of alleged oral discussions that predated the signed 
Operating Agreement. For example, the State elicited testimony from its expert that 
basis for any of the theft charges. That Mr. Posey's legal conclusion may be 
incorrect has no relation to the crimes charged." (R.146 n. l.) 
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he had "investigated several cases where the stuff on paper doesn't necessarily match 
the verbal agreement," and that he believed "[t]here had been verbal conversations 
about what the deal was." (R.1534, p. 228:2-9, p. 234:6-18.) 
The State and the Poseys also argued to the jury the very interpretation of 
Tivoli's operating agreement that Judge Skanchy had already rejected, i.e., that the 
consent of all members was required for all expenditures over $500. (E.g., R.1534, 
p. 240:4-9, p. 241 :6-19, p. 246:4-22, pp. 248-249:20-7 (State's investigator 
repeatedly testifying that "everyone should have agreed" to release funds).) 
The State even asked its investigator whether, in his "experience when it 
comes to interpreting contracts," witnesses in other trials commonly testify as to what 
contract language means. The witness replied, "Yes. Almost in every case." 
(R.1535, p. 158:4-14.) 
The Information 
A Criminal Information was filed in the Third District Court on May 9, 2011. 
(R.l.) An Amended Information was filed on March 23, 2012. (R.69.) (Except 
where otherwise noted, references to "the Information" herein are to the Amended 
Information.) 
The Information alleged that Didericksen had committed 10 counts of second-
degree felony theft, 11 counts of third-degree felony theft, 4 counts of class A 
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misdemeanor theft, and 3 counts of class B misdemeanor theft, plus one count of 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a second degree felony. (R.69.) 
Each theft count stated that "the defendants obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another (Kerry and Bobbie Posey) with a purpose to 
deprive them thereof" Each count identified a specific "check #" and a statement 
that "the value of the property is or exceeds" a dollar amount depending on the 
amount of the check. For example, Count 1 says it is based on "check #1006," which 
was a check written on December 10, 2007, in the amount of $2,000.00. (See State's 
Exh. 4, p. I.) Thus, for Count I the Information reads: 
COUNT 1 
THEFT 
a third degree felony 
From on or about December 2007, the defendants obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another (Kerry and 
Bobbie Posey) with a purpose to deprive them thereof. The value of the 
property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but is less than $5,000.00 (check 
#1006). This is a violation of Utah Code § 76-6-404, a third degree 
felony. 
The checks found to be theft 
A table of the 12 checks for which the jury found theft, their dates, their face 
amounts, and those amounts reduced to the Poseys' 25 percent ( with the resulting 
degree of offense) is set forth here: 
Face amount 25% of face 
Check ( count) Date of check amount· 
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Face amount 25% of face 
Check ( count) Date of check amount 
Count2 12/21/2007 $31,506.85 $7,876.71 
Check #1007 (2nd degree 
felony) 
Count3 1/7/2008 $5,300 $1,325 
Check #1012 (class A 
misdemeanor) 
Count4 1/15/2008 $4,080 $1,020 
Check #1015 (class A 
misdemeanor) 
Count5 1/04/2008 $4,500 $1125 
Check #1016 (class A 
misdemeanor) 
Count 7 1/11/2008 $18,493.15 $4,623.29 
Check #1018 (3rd degree 
felony) 
Count 8 1/9/2008 $100,000 $25,000 
Check #1019 (2nd degree 
felony) 
Count 15 1/25/2008 $3,475 $868.75 
Check#l029 (class A 
misdemeanor) 
Count 19 2/15/2008 $4,015.52 $1,003.88 
Check #1041 (class A 
misdemeanor) 
Count 21 3/31/2008 $5,000 $1,250 
Check#1047 (class A 
misdemeanor) 
Count22 2/20/2008 $4,000 $1,000 
Check#1098 (class A 
misdemeanor) 
Count24 4/11/2008 $7,500 $1,875 
Check #1051 (3rd degree 
felony) 
Count28 9/4/2008 $983.81 $245.95 
Check #1070 (class B 
misdemeanor) 
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(See also R. 83 (State's summary of checks, dates, amounts, and payees); State's 
Exh. 4 (checks); R. 900-951 Gury instructions specifying which checks are associated 
with each count), and 971-973 (verdict).) 
The defendants ' settlement with the Poseys 
In November 2008, more than two years before any criminal charges were 
filed, the Poseys entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release with Equity 
Partners, Didericksen and Bruun. (R.294-305, attached hereto as Add. Exh. F.) 
Pursuant to the settlement and release, Equity Partners signed over to the Poseys 
the 29 acres in Saratoga Springs plus a $174,000 payment from UDOT for a small 
parcel, and the Poseys paid Equity Partners $25,000.00. The Poseys released any 
claims relating to the 28 checks that the Poseys were questioning. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Liability for theft turns on whether the expenditures made were authorized. 
In this case, a controlling statute (the Utah Limited Liability Company Act) 
expressly authorized the alleged misconduct: Under the LLC Act, owners of two-
thirds or greater interests in an LLC can apply company resources to activities 
outside the stated purposes of the company or the operating agreement, regardless 
of allegedly contrary desires of minority owners. The defendants here owned at 
least 7 5% of the profits interests of the LLC. Additionally and separately, a 
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controlling document (the LLC's Operating Agreement) also authorized the 
defendants' alleged actions. 
The LLC Act and Operating Agreement should have been interpreted as a 
matter of law and applied by the trial court; at a minimum, the jury should have 
been instructed as to their provisions and effect. To the extent the LLC Act was 
not preserved below, this dispositive principle is reviewable under the doctrines of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and manifest injustice. 
An additional error occurred when the trial court allowed the State to charge 
100% of the value of the checks when the alleged victims had (at most) a 25% 
interest in those funds under the Operating Agreement and statute. Had the court 
correctly applied Utah law, the charged amounts would have dropped to 
misdemeanor level and would have been barred by the statute of limitations as to 
" all but four counts. 
A third error occurred with the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on a 
lesser included offense. By statute, wrongful appropriation is a lesser included 
offense of theft. The State's own argument to the jury supported a conviction of 
wrongful appropriation rather than theft, which would have resulted in reduced 
penalties and eliminated the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act count (because 
wrongful appropriation is not a predicate act under UPUAA). This reversible error 
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is reviewable under the doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, 
or manifest injustice. 
In addition to the theft counts, Mr. Bruun was charged and convicted under 
the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, which requires at least three predicate 
offenses occurring over a "substantial period of time." The jury was not instructed 
as to this required element. Additionally, although the Utah Supreme Court has 
not determined the parameters of this element, other courts have overwhelmingly 
held that less than one year does not meet this requirement. The checks at issue 
were made over a four-month period (with one isolated check five months later), 
which was insufficient as a matter of law. Moreover, had the jury been given the 
opportunity to and found wrongful appropriation (instead of theft), these would not 
be predicate offenses as defined under UPUAA. Either way the count should be 
dismissed as a matter of law. These reversible errors are reviewable under the 
doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and manifest injustice. 
With respect to restitution, the trial court ordered Didericksen to pay the full 
face amounts of the 12 checks for which he was convicted. By law, restitution 
cannot exceed the (at most) 25% ownership interest the alleged victims had in the 
funds. Furthermore, the court erred in failing to consider amounts previously 
received by the Poseys in compensation for the allegedly misappropriated funds. 
This double recovery by the Poseys is reversible error. 
22 
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Finally, the cumulative effect of all of the above errors was to deprive 
Didericksen of a trial and sentencing that was fair in either appearance or reality. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY ACT AND THE 
WRITTEN OPERATING AGREEMENT WERE QUESTIONS OF 
LAW FOR THE COURT, AND AUTHORIZED DIDERICKSEN'S 
ACTIONS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Didericksen was charged with multiple counts of theft of an LLC's property. 
The State was thus required ~o establish, as a threshold element, that Didericksen's 
use of the LLC' s property was "unauthorized." This question should never have 
reached a jury because, as a matter of law, Didericksen's alleged actions were 
expressly authorized by two sources that should have been interpreted, and applied, 
by the trial court as a matter of law: 1) the Limited Liability Company Act, Utah 
Code § 48-2c-100, et seq., and 2) the LLC's written Operating Agreement. 
A. Under the LLC Act, the defendants' alleged actions were 
authorized as a matter of law because they owned more than two-
thirds of the profits interests in the LLC. 
As noted above, Tivoli' s Operating Agreement expressly states that the 
defendants' profit-sharing interest in Tivoli was 7 5 percent. See p. 10, supra. That 
undisputed fact in itself precludes the criminal charges here. 
The legislature wanted majority owners of LLCs to have considerable 
flexibility in operating their companies, and provided accordingly. Under the Utah 
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Limited Liability Company Act, owners of two-thirds or more of the sharing 
interests in an LLC have extremely broad authority - even to take actions in 
contravention to the operating agreement or the stated purpose of an LLC. 
Utah Code § 48-2c-804(4) provides that "[N]o manager shall have authority 
to do any act in contravention of the articles of organization or the operating 
agreement, except as provided in Subsection 6(g).") (Emphasis added.) Under 
Subsection 6(g) [48-2c-804(6)(g)J, "members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in 
the company, and 2/3 of the managers shall be required for all matters described in 
Subsection 48-2c-303(3)."7 
The latter subsection [48-2c-303(3)}, in tum, permits members holding two-
thirds of the profits interests in a company to "authoriz[ e] a member or any other 
person to do any act on behalf of the company that is not in the ordinary course of 
the company's business, or business of the kind carried on by the company." § 48-
2c-303(3). 
Holders of a two-thirds or greater profits interest are further authorized to 
"mak[ e] a substantial change in the business purpose of the company[.]" § 48-2c-
7 Profits interest means that portion of the company's profits to be allocated to an 
individual member. upon an allocation of profits. § 48-2c-l 02(20). The State's 
expert acknowledged that the allocation of profits to the Poseys was 12.5% each 
(R.1535, p. 167); see also § 48-2c-906 (profits and losses of an LLC "shall be 
allocated among the members in the manner provided in the operating 
agreement"). 
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803(3)(d). And they may "resolv[e] any dispute connected with the usual and 
regular course of the company's business[,]" among other things, see § 48-2c-
803(3)(c), all in contravention of the Operating Agreement. 
Under the plain language of the statute, the trial court's error is manifest. Put 
simply, the court should have dismissed the counts from the inception. Because 
the defendants undisputedly held a greater than two-thirds profits interest in Tivoli 
as defined in the LLC Act, the court should have recognized that the defendants 
had express statutory authority to enter into the joint venture and expend Tivoli 
funds on the Hidden Acres development, regardless of any allegation that it was in 
contravention of the Operating Agreement or not in the course of Tivoli' s regular 
b . 8 usmess. 
B. The Operating Agreement authorized defendants' alleged actions 
as a matter of law, and should have been interpreted by the court, 
not the jury. 
Didericksen' s alleged actions were also authorized as a matter of law by the 
Operating Agreement. Under the LLC Act, the adoption of an LLC's initial 
operating agreement must be by "unanimous consent of the members." Utah Code 
§ 48-2c-501. The reason for that is obvious: The manager of an LLC must be 
~ 8 At a minimum, the jury should have been instructed as to these dispositive 
provisions of the LLC Act. 
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entitled to rely on a written document through which all members have conferred 
certain authority. 
Once an operating agreement is executed, that document is not simply one 
piece of evidence that jurors may give "whatever weight" they choose. If the 
Operating Agreement authorizes the manager to do certain things - for example, to 
enter into joint ventures (Add. Exh. D, § 7.4.7) - then a disgruntled LLC minority 
member cannot ask that such provisions be ignored. Alleged oral discussions or 
understandings predating the signed Operating Agreement are legally irrelevant. 
Indeed, such discussions were not even admissible here, because Tivoli' s 
Operating Agreement was fully integrated. 
An integrated agreement is "a writing or writings constituting a final 
expression of one or more terms of an agreement." Tangren Family Trust v. 
Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ,r 12, 182 P.3d 326. A contract is integrated if it contains a 
clear integration clause, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible on the question of 
integration. Id., ,r,r 17, 19. 
The Tivoli Operating Agreement has an integration clause. See p. 15, supra. 
Under settled Utah law, therefore, evidence of prior oral communications or 
understanding is not admissible to contradict the provisions of the agreement. 
Tangren Family Trust, supra. Nonetheless, the trial court expressly allowed such 
testimony. (E.g., R.1534, 11/8/13 Tr., p. 14:1-11 (State's expert testifying that, 
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from the Posey's testimony, it was his opm1on that expenditures had to be 
approved by all Tivoli members); id., pp. 39-40:20-5 ("[W]e look to the evidence 
as were the transactions authorized or approved? Under the agreements, under the 
vJP representations, verbal and otherwise, under the understanding of the parties, were 
those transactions authorized?") and pp. 49-50:23-8 (stating that his conclusion 
that a majority of expenditures discussed were unauthorized was based "partly" on 
the operating agreement, as well as "verbal, and email representations[.]").) 
Once evidence of allegedly inconsistent oral communications, etc., 1s 
excluded, all that should have been left was interpretation of the applicable 
provisions of the Operating Agreement. Interpretation of a written document is a 
question of law, Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, ,r 19, 
258 P.3d 539, which means that it was a question for the court, not the jury. Utah 
VP Code§ 77-17-10(1) ("In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the 
court[.]"). 
The State successfully argued below, however, that interpretation of the 
Operating Agreement was for the jury for the sole reason that this is a criminal 
case. According to the State, parties lose their right to have operating agreements 
interpreted by a court if the party is charged criminally - in other words, the 
greater the stake (loss of liberty), the fewer the rights. The State's argument, as the 
State itself wrote, was this: 
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The State filed theft charges under § 76-6-404 of the Utah Criminal Code. 
Thus, this is obviously not a breach of contract action. The Operating 
Agreement is merely one of several exhibits that the State introduced as 
evidence to support the charges. The jurors heard extensive testimony 
regarding the Operating Agreement, had ample opportunity to review it, and 
give it whatever weight they thought it deserved. The defendants offer no 
rule of evidence or any other legal authority holding that only the District 
Court - instead of the jury - can interpret the Operating Agreement as an 
item of evidence in a criminal action. As for the cases that the defendants 
cite in their Supplemental Blief, they are all civil cases involving breach of 
contract claims - not criminal theft allegations. In essence, the defendants 
are confusing questions of evidence with questions of contract law. 
(R.1444 ( all emphasis in original).) 
The State (and trial court) were simply wrong. Just as in civil cases, the 
court is also required to decide questions of law in criminal cases. Utah Code § 
77-17-10(1). There is no "criminal case" exception to the concept that 
interpretation of contracts is a question of law. In fact, this Court has interpreted 
contracts as a matter of law for the very purpose of assessing whether a 
defendant's use of property was (un)authorized for purposes of a theft conviction. 
In State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the defendant sold 
his house to a buyer through a private financing agreement. Under the written 
agreement, the buyer was to pay the defendant, and the defendant would make 
payments on the deeds of trust encumbering the house. The contract did not 
specifically state that the buyer's payments were to be used solely to make 
payments on the deeds of trust; however, the defendant's requests that the buyer 
pay him on time so that he would not become delinquent on the deeds of trust 
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suggested that, in practice, the payments were being so applied. The defendant 
was convicted of two counts of second-degree felony theft when he accepted two 
payments from the buyer and did not apply them to the trust deeds. 
This Court reversed. The defendant could be convicted of theft only if the 
State showed "unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof," the court's analysis began. Id. at 818-819 (emphasis in 
original). The State acknowledged that "the contract terms [were] not explicit" 
that the defendant was obligated to pay money received from the buyer toward the 
trust deeds. Id. at 819. The State sought to remedy that problem by arguing that 
the buyer's subjective intent, coupled with the defendant's requests for timely 
payment, demonstrated an obligation to remit the payment, i.e., that "he was not 
authorized to do anything with [the buyer's] money but pass it along to the 
~ lenders." 
The Court rejected the State's attempt, interpreting the contract as a matter 
of law. "[T]he terms of the contract underlying this transaction are unambigious 
and create no express duty requiring [the defendant] to pay over the sums received 
from [the buyer]," the Court concluded. Id. "We construe unambiguous contracts 
as a matter of law and accord no deference to the trial court's ruling." Id. ( citing 
civil contract cases). The Court went on: 
The contract imposes an uncontroverted requirement that [the defendant] 
pay [the trust deeds], but does not mention any requirement that [the 
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Id. 
defendant] apply [the buyer's] payments to the trust deeds, nor does the 
contract limit [the defendant] to making payments only with funds received 
from [the buyer] .... We find nothing in the language of the agreement which 
requires [the defendant] to apply funds received from [the buyer] to the 
Valley and First Security loans. 
The Court noted that the case involved 
the criminal prosecution of what is essentially a breach of a real estate sale 
agreement. ... In that posture, we are loathe to give approval to the broad 
construction of section 76-6-404 [the theft statute] urged upon us by the 
state. Were we to do so, it is likely that memorials of commercial 
transactions would soon be drafted to include boilerplate language designed 
to impose criminal liability for interruptions in the stream of payments - a 
circumstance which would normally be nothing more than a breach of 
contract, traditionally viewed as adequately remedied through an action of 
law. 
Id. at 819; see also State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1167 n.6 (Utah 1980) ("A 
theft conviction requires proof of the intent to illegally and permanently deprive 
one of his property, not merely of a breach of the terms of a business agreement."). 
The Court has similarly interpreted written agreements in other criminal 
cases. E.g., State v. Stringham, 957 P .2d 602, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(reviewing terms of written agreement found to exist by the jury, noting that 
"double-payment was not authorized by defendant's agreement with APA"); cf 
State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 418 (rejecting claim of authority to use funds where 
only written provision cited by defendant regarding authority was a general 
nonrefundability clause in an earnest money agreement). 
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As noted in Burton, it is a court's role to interpret unambiguous agreements 
as a matter of law. The result would be the same, however, even if the trial court 
had found the operating agreement to be ambiguous. To do so, the court would 
L9 first have had to conclude that "it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ,r 25, 190 P.3d 1269 (citations 
and internal quotations omitted). 
If a provision is ambiguous, the jury's role is to decide the parties' intent at 
the time they adopted that specific provision. The State did not argue that, 
however, and the jury was not so instructed - most likely because it would have 
Vi) 
been fatal to the State's case: By definition, a finding of ambiguity would have 
meant that the defendants' interpretation of their authority was reasonable. 
More problematically for the State, the legislature has prescribed a specific 
method for resolving ambiguities in operating agreements. Under the LLC Act, 
'4P the holders of two-thirds profits interests are expressly authorized to resolve 
disputes regarding the conduct of the business. Utah Code § 48-2c-803(3)( c ). 
That broad provision, by its terms, would include disputes over which of two 
reasonable interpretations of an operating agreement to follow. (Indeed, as noted, 
the legislature has even authorized such super-majority interest holders to 
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contravene operating agreements.) The Operating Agreement itself also confers 
similar authority on Tivoli's managers. See pp. 14-15, supra. 
In short, by statute and express written agreement, Equity Partners 
(Didericksen and Bruun) had the authority to interpret or reconcile inconsistent 
provisions or resolve ambiguities. If the Operating Agreement were ambiguous, 
the State could not meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Operating Agreement did not authorize, for example, the Hidden Acres joint 
venture. State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982) ("[T]he burden is on the state 
to show unauthorized control, not on the defendant to show authorized control.") 
( emphasis in original). 
In sum, reversal and dismissal of all counts is compelled by both the LLC 
Act and the Operating Agreement. 
C. Any of the foregoing issues not preserved should be reviewed for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and manifest 
injustice. 
The defendants argued below that the trial court was required to interpret the 
Operating Agreement as a matter of law. Seep. 2, supra, Issue I Preservation. 
That issue, accordingly, was fully preserved. If the Court concludes that the effect 
of the LLC Act was not preserved, the Court should still reverse under the 
doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, or manifest injustice. 
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1. Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
show 1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and 2) that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. 
State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 18, 321 P.3d 1136. In this case, those elements 
would be met. 
As shown above, the LLC Act expressly authorizes the exact conduct of which 
the defendants were accused, i.e., allegedly acting in contravention of an operating 
agreement or changing or going outside the business of the company. See pp. 23-25, 
supra. The Act also contains other provisions directly supportive of the defendant's 
innocence in this case. See pp. 24-25, supra. 
Didericksen's trial counsel did not mention this governing statute, however, let 
alone ask the trial court to apply it or to instruct the jury in accordance with its 
.;;; provisions. Failing to discover or address a dispositive state statute is a deficiency 
that falls well below any objective standard of care. See, e.g., State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 
49, ,r 38, 343 P.3d 1250. That this omission was prejudicial is shown above - among 
other things, the statute affords a complete defense to all charges. 
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2. Plain error. 
To show plain error, an appellant must show that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is hannful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, that confidence in the verdict is undermined." State 
v. Bedell, 2014 UT I, ,r 20,322 P.3d 697. Those elements are, again, met here. 
Didericksen has shown above that it was error not to apply governing 
provisions of the LLC Act and that, but for that error, the counts would have been 
dismissed. That error should have been obvious to the trial court: The entire issue 
before the court was whether the managers of an LLC were authorized to use LLC 
funds. It should be obvious that LLC statutes would come into play. When a 
dispositive issue is the subject of a clear statute, failure to apply that statute is plain 
error. 
Given that the statute is straightforward (not fact-intensive or complex) and 
could not conceivably have been ignored on strategic grounds, it should have been 
obvious to the court and parties below. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645 
(2014) (citing State v. Gornick, 340 OR.160, 130 P.3d 780, 783 (2006) as 
"identifying the following considerations as suggesting that an error is _'plain': that 
the error is one of law; that it is 'obvious, not reasonably in dispute'; that it 'appears 
on the face of the record,' meaning that the reviewing court does not need to 'go 
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outside the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences,' 
such as a strategy of the parties; and that 'the facts constituting the error are 
irrefutable')"). 
The prejudice from such error is also obvious: the convictions cannot stand, 
and the jury would likely have reached a different result if instructed about the 
~ statutory authority possessed by two-thirds profits holders. 
3. Manifest injustice. 
Apart from the preceding two contentions, the govemmg LLC Act 
provisions should be reached to prevent manifest injustice. A state statute directly 
relates to, and exonerates, the defendant's alleged acts. The defendant has multiple 
felony convictions on his record, has a large restitution judgment against him, and 
his freedom will be constrained well into the next decade, all unnecessarily. 
II. ALL BUT FOUR COUNTS SHOULD HA VE BEEN DISMISSED, OR 
A NEW TRIAL GRANTED, BECAUSE THE VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN IS LIMITED TO THE 
VICTIM'S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. 
A. The value of "property of another" is limited to the other's 
interest-in the property. 
The State acknowledged below that, under the law, a person cannot be 
charged with stealing his own property. The State correctly noted, however, that 
"[i]t is no defense ... that the actor has an interest in the property ... stolen if another 
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person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe[.]" Utah Code § 
76-6-402(2). 
As § 76-6-402(2) indicates on its face, the "infringement" ·(theft) is limited 
to the extent of the other person's interest. More specifically, the value of the 
property allegedly stolen is defined by, and limited to, the alleged victim's interest. 
This rather obvious proposition has been settled in Utah for more than 70 years. 
In State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626 (1943), the defendant took his 
car to a mechanic for repairs. By law, the mechanic had a statutory lien on 
(interest in) the car to the extent of his unpaid services. Without having paid the 
bill in full, the defendant took back his car, and was subsequently charged with 
stealing the automobile from the garage owner. He was charged with grand 
larceny because the value of the automobile was more than $50.00. 
The defendant argued that he could not be charged with stealing his own 
property, i.e., a car that he owned. While agreeing with that proposition generally, 
the Supreme Court held that it does not apply to the extent that another party - in 
that case, the mechanic - has a legal interest in the property. Id. at 631. The 
principal opinion ordered a new trial because, among other things, the jury was not 
instructed on the nature of the garage owner's interest in the property. Id. at 630 
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("Not one word in the instructions is said with reference to a bailor or bailee, to a 
lienholder's rights, or to general or special property in a chattel .... ")9 
Through concurring opinions, a majority of the justices made clear that the 
~ value of the property stolen was not the value of the automobile, but only the 
amount of the mechanic's legal interest. Chief Justice Wolfe wrote: 
The opinion rightly states that at common law a bailor could steal his own 
chattel from a bailee. What he stole was the special property of the bail or in 
the chattel.. .. By the reasoning above, when the chattel possess a legal 
attribute or property in respect to the bailee by which he can retain 
possession for recourse, such attribute is a property of the whole chattel but 
its value is as to the bailee only the amount of his indebtedness. Mr. Justice 
McDonough has developed this matter according to the intent of the 
legislature as discerned from the gradation of degrees of larceny. I agree 
with his conclusions in this regard. The third question must therefore be 
answered that if the jury found only $3 0 owning, the offense must be 
considered a misdemeanor. 
Id. at 631 (Wolfe, C.J., concurring). 
Although the adequacy of jury instructions was not raised by the parties, 
Chief Justice Wolfe concluded that "the lack of an instruction as to the amount of 
v; the indebtedness being the measure of grand or petty larceny may not be only an 
inadequacy but be misleading." Id. at 632. "Since the first element in Instruction 
No. 5 used the phrase 'did steal, take and carry away one automobile of the value 
of more than fifty dollars' the jury's mind would naturally conclude that the value 
~ 9 "This case illustrates the misuse of the criminal machinery of the law m 
attempting to enforce a civil obligation," the opinion noted. Id. at 626. 
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of the car and not the special property of the complaining witness was the measure 
of whether the offense was petty or grand larceny." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Agreeing with Justice Wolfe's conclusion, Justice McDonough offered the 
example of a mechanic who was owed $1 for material and labor on a bicycle worth 
$50. If the bicycle's owner stole it from the mechanic, the crime would only be a 
misdemeanor (i.e., below $50), he observed: 
We must refer the degree of the offense to the assumed injury to the 
owner .... It is true that if a thief who has no property rights therein, steals 
property worth $100 from one who has merely the possession thereof, he is 
guilty of grand larceny even though the one in possession was not even 
rightfully in possession. However, in such case the thief deprives the true 
owner of property of value $100. He likewise enriches himself to the same 
extent. But we should not apply such rule so as to say that by stealing 
property of $100 in value from a lienholder, the general owner is guilty of 
grand larceny although he deprived the possessor of only $1 in value and 
enriched himself but to the same extent. The value of the property taken, as 
such words are used in the [statute] should be held to be but $1. 
Id at 633; see also id. at 634 (Wade, J., concurring) ("I agree with Mr. Justice 
McDonough that the value of the property stolen cannot exceed the amount of the 
lien which the lienholder has against it at the time of taking."). 
The jury was misled here in a manner similar to Parker. The specific 
"property" charged by the State as having been stolen was 12 individual checks 
written from Tivoli, LLC's bank account. See pp. 17-18, supra. Nonetheless, the 
jury was instructed on the entire face value of the checks, rather than the 25 
percent interest that (at most) the Poseys had under the written Operating 
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Agreement. Indeed, the jury received no instruction at all that the value was 
limited to the Poseys' interest in the funds. 
The State has the burden of proving the value of the property stolen. State v. 
~ Forshee, 588 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1978); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659, 662 
(Utah 1985); State v. Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P. 789, 790 (1917). 10 In response 
to the inconvenient interest pcn;cntagcs to which the alleged victims had 
themselves agreed, the State proffered two theories to justify claiming the full face 
value of the checks. First, the State argued that the Poseys had "a contractual 
right" to receive $750,000 from Tivoli for the purchase of the property, and that 
"the 25% interest the Poseys had (12.5% each) was in Tivoli's profits after they 
were paid the remaining $2. 7 5 million of the purchase price due to them. The 
Poseys were due the $2.75 million before Equity Pa11ners received any profits 
from Tivoli. Thus, while the money deposited into Tivoli's account may have 
been designated for Tivoli, the Poseys maintained a complete interest in it until 
they were paid the remaining $2. 7 5 million in full." (R.144 7 ( emphasis in 
original).) 
10 This requirement is particularly critical "when the value alleged is close to the 
line dividing one offense from another." State v. Larsen, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (vacating felony conviction where the State's evidence was of the 
~ original purchase price of the stolen property rather than the value at the time of 
the theft). 
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The State's own argument was self-defeating: as the State acknowledged, 
the claim to money relating to purchase of the property was "a contractual right" to 
receive the remaining purchase price - in other words, the Poseys were ordinary 
creditors of Tivoli with respect to that sale. The State cited no authority for the 
proposition that someone who allegedly steals from an entity may be charged with 
the full amount of creditors' unsecured claims against that entity. Nor was the 
State's argument supported by the theft statute, which bars even such a contention 
with respect to secured claims. See Utah Code § 76-6-402(2) (under theft statute, 
"an interest in property for purposes of this subsection shall not include a security 
interest for the repayment of a debt or obligation."). 
The State tried a different tack in its closing argument, telling the jury that 
the value of the property at issue was $3.5 million. (R.1538, p. 17:13-25.) That 
was based on a wholly improper argument that the "property" was the 29 acres of 
land purchased by Equity Partners and assigned to Tivoli - something that was 
neither alleged in the Information nor in the Jury Instructions, which expressly 
defined the "property" stolen as the 12 checks. (R.69-77; R. 900-951.) 
Apart from the failure to charge the defendants with theft of real estate rather 
than the checks, the State's new theory was baseless under the LLC Act. Even 
when an LLC owns real property, by statute a member's interest is personal 
property regardless of the nature of the property owned by the company. Utah 
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Code § 48-2c-701(1). Members have no interest in, or claim to, specific assets 
held by an LLC. Id. § 48-2c-701 (2). The State had no basis whatsoever for 
claiming that the value of the checks charged was the value of a piece of real 
property owned by the LLC. 
In short: The defendants were charged with misusing an LLC's funds by 
writing some unauthorized checks from the LLC's bank account. The defendants 
owned all but 25 percent of the allegedly stolen LLC funds. As a matter of law, 
the value of the allegedly stolen property was no more than 25 percent of the 
checks at issue. The jury should have been instructed accordingly, and reversal is 
compelled on that ground alone. 
B. Correctly applying the law, all but four counts should be 
dismissed as time barred. 
As Didericksen's trial counsel repeatedly advised the trial court, limiting the 
value of the checks to the Poseys' 25% interest would have dropped all but four 
counts (2, 7, 8, and 24) below the felony threshold. (See Table, p. 19, supra.) Had 
the State amended its Information accordingly, the resulting misdemeanors would 
then have been subject to dismissal based upon the two-year statute of limitations. 
Utah Code§ 76-1-302(1)(b). 
The State bears the burden of proving that a criminal action is not barred by 
vii the statute of limitations. State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
It would have no argument here, particularly where the Poseys brought their 
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complaints to the State well within the statute of limitations period even for 
misdemeanors. (R.1520, p. 31:15-24.)11 
Independent of all other issues on appeal, the court should reverse 
Didericksen' s convictions and remand with instructions to dismiss all but Counts 
2, 7, 8, and 24 as time barred. 
III. THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO 
INSTRUCT ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION. 
A. The jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense 
of wrongful appropriation. 
By statute, and as acknowledged by the State, "[ w ]rongful appropriation is a 
lesser included offense of theft. See § 76-6-404.5( 4), Utah Code Annotated." 
(R.86.) "A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the owner 
or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the 
property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of possession of the 
property." § 76-6-404.5(1). 
11 One might surmise that this limitations problem was the driving force behind the 
State's overcharging of the defendants. The Poseys presented their allegations to 
the State in September 2008, well within a two-year period, but the State had not 
filed the Information until March 2011, after the limitation period for 
misdemeanors had passed. Id. 
42 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court did not instruct the jury on wrongful appropriation, or include it 
as an option on the special verdict form. This was a critical omission. "Wrongful 
appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as provided in Section 76-6-
~ 412 .... " § 76-6-404.5(3). Not only does wrongful appropriation result in reduced 
penalties, but conviction on the lesser included offense would have resulted in 
~ automatic and non-appealable acquittals on the greater theft charges. See § 76-1-
403(1) and (2). Additionally, wrongful appropriation is not a predicate offense upon 
which a violation of the Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act can be based. See § 7 6-10-
'4 
1603 (list of UPUAA predicate offenses does not include § 76-6-404.5). 
Accordingly, had the jury convicted only of wrongful appropriation, the defendants 
would been acquitted on the UPUAA claim. 
The only difference between theft and wrongful appropriation is the length of 
time that the jury believes the defendant intended to appropriate the property. 
Compare§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-404.5. In support of its theft counts, the State argued 
to the jury that it need not find an intent to permanently deprive, that essentially it 
could convict for any intended deprivation for any period of time. (R.153 8, p. 20:2-
16 ("You are instructed that if one misappropriates and converts to his own use 
money or property belonging to another under circumstances that constitute theft, it is 
not made otherwise because the one doing so might have some intention of restoring 
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the loss sometime .... If someone commits a theft and has someone else's property, 
whether it's 30 months, 30 days, 30 seconds, returning it is not a defense.") 
Under the State's own argument- that the jury could convict Didericksen even 
if the intended deprivation was as little as 3 0 days or 3 0 seconds - the jury could 
easily have found such deprivation "temporary," i.e., wrongful appropriation rather 
than theft. That is particularly true when the alleged actions extended over a 
relatively short period of time, the defendants owned at least 7 5 percent of Tivoli, 
and had reimbursed Tivoli for certain expenditures in the past (e.g., R.1535, p. 278-
279:23-7; R.1536, p. 179-180:9-5). 
The trial court was obligated to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense 
of wrongful appropriation. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) 
(instruction must be given if there is any rational basis for acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense); § 76-1-402(4). 
Failure to do so was reversible error on all counts. 
B. This issue should be reviewed for ineffective assistance of counsel 
and manifest injustice. 
Notwithstanding the clear statutory language and the State's acknowledgement 
that wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of theft, the 
defendants' trial counsel "forwent an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
misappropriation" (R.1383); see also R.1537, p. 214 (counsel stating that they were 
"dropping" request for wrongful appropriation instruction). Counsel also did not 
44 
~-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
object to a Verdict Form with theft as the jury's only option. (R.971 (verdict form).) 
Trial counsel's reason for this decision was a belief that an agreement was in 
place with the State that the trial court would interpret the Operating Agreement and 
determine the Poseys' legal interest after the verdict. (R.1383.) Before the jury was 
instructed, the court was advised that the defendants and State had an agreement: 
MR. DIUMENTI: I think we've resolved it, your Honor. Go ahead, 
Cli£ I think you can articulate the issue that we've agreed with [Mr. Taylor, 
the State's counsel] about better than I can. 
MR. THO:l.\1PSON: Well, yes. Counsel discussed that we are going to 
ask the Court to look into the issue of what percentage of the ownership of the 
assets under the contract, as a matter of law, is actually the Poseys' in 
determining what the sentence should be. [Mr. Taylor] suggested that we brief 
this in the intervening time. 
THE COURT: Okay. Sure. I'll look at briefs if you want to do them. 
MR. TAYLOR: So I'll just wait to see something from you? And then 
I' 11 just file a responding brief. 
(R.1538, p. 102:11-24.) 
Accordingly, after the verdict, the defendants filed a memorandum addressing 
the value of the Poseys' property as a matter of law, along with a motion for 
~ judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (R.984.) In response, however, the State 
argued that the court should not interpret the Operating Agreement as a matter of law. 
(R.1039.) 
In their briefing, defense counsel stated that their discussion with the State's 
counsel was "that the issue of what the true dollar amount of the Poseys' property 
involved in the thefts was a matter of contract interpretation, and was a determination 
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of law and a matter for the Court, not the Jury, and that the issue would be submitted 
if the Defendants were convicted." (R.985; R.1125.) 
The State denied that the statements made to the court reflected a stipulation 
that the Operating Agreement would be interpreted by the trial court as a matter of 
law; "[r]ather," according to the State, "the State suggested that the defendants could 
reserve this issue for future briefing in the event of gui1ty verdicts." (R.1444.) 
Defense counsel's interpretation of the agreement seems more consistent with 
the actual statement in court. At the very least, an attorney could reasonably infer 
agreement from the State's response to counsel's characterization. Regardless, what 
is clear is that either: 1) Didericksen' s trial counsel reasonably believed there was a 
stipulation with the State on which he relied in foregoing the instruction, and on 
which the State later reneged, or 2) Didericksen's trial counsel unr~asonably believed 
there was a stipulation with the State. Either way, a new trial is required, either to 
remedy a manifest injustice or to remedy ineffective assistance of counsel. 
This Court has provided guidance on when the failure to request a lesser-
included offense instruction constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. "The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 
246 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ( citation omitted). To establish such a failure, the 
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defendant must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness," and that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial. .. whose result is reliable." Id 
If Didericksen' s trial counsel waived a lesser included offense instruction due 
to an unreasonable belief that a stipulation existed with the State, that unreasonable 
4' action - by definition - fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment. It would mean that counsel gave up an important right, one that could 
have produced lower sentences and eliminated the most serious felony count 
(UPUAA), for literally no reason, no conceivable benefit to the defendant. 
Alternatively, if the exchange in court did reflect a stipulation, or could 
reasonably have been interpreted as a stipulation by counsel, upon which the State 
later reneged, then the Court's review of this issue is necessary to prevent manifest 
injustice. 
IV. THE UPUAA COUNT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, OR THE CONVICTION REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO 
vJ GIVE A COMPLETE ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION, AND BECAUSE 
WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION IS NOT A PREDICATE OFFENSE. 
A. The trial court did not instruct the jury on all the required 
elements of UPUAA. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, "a defendant has the right to have a jury 
determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the defendant is guilty of every 
element of the crime charged." State v. Duran, 2011 UT App 254, ,r 16, 262 P .3d 
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468. In this case, the State charged Didericksen with one count of violating the 
Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act,§ 76-10-1603. (See R.77-78.) 
Among the statutory elements of UPUAA is the existence of a "pattern of 
unlawful activity." Utah Code§ 76-10-1603. The State submitted a proposed jury 
instruction on that element, to which Didericksen' s trial counsel did not object: 
"Pattern of Unlawful Activity" means engaging in conduct which 
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, 
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes 
shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to each 
other or to the enterprise. The most recent act constituting part of a pattern 
of unlawful activity as defined shall have occurred within 5 years of the 
commission of the next preceeding [sic] act alleged as part of the pattern. 
(R.496, ,r 2.) While this instruction is a quote from part of the Act (§ 76-10-
1602(2)), it fails to require the jury to find a required element of a pattern under 
UPUAA, i.e., that the required predicate acts occurred over a "substantial period of 
time." See Hill v. Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28, ,r 39, 216 P.3d 929. As such, the 
instruction constitutes reversible error as a matter of law. 
The reference to "continuing unlawful conduct" was added to the statutory 
definition of "pattern" shortly after the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of federal RICO in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 
n.14, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Accordingly, the Utah Supreme 
Court has said, "it makes sense to use the Supreme Court's clarification of that 
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phrase as the test for whether there is a pattern of unlawful activity." Hill, 2009 
UT 28, if 38. 
That clarification, the court noted, came in H J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). In HJ., 
the U. S. Supreme Court rejected a contention that multiple schemes were required 
to establish a pattern. The court held, however, that continuity must be shown. 
With respect to closed continuity ( when the alleged activities have ended prior to 
charges being filed), "[ c ]ontinuity may be ~emonstrated 'over a closed period by 
proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time[.]" 
Id., 492 U.S. at 241-242, 109 S.Ct. at 2901. 
Adopting a similar interpretation of UPUAA's pattern requirement, the Utah 
Supreme Court held in Hill that "[t]he proper test for determining whether there 
was a pattern of unlawful activity, is whether there was 'a series of related 
predicates extending over a substantial period of time' or a demonstrated threat of 
~ continuing unlawful activity and not whether there were multiple schemes." 2009 
UT 28, ,r 41. 
The State's instruction given by the trial court omitted the key requirement 
that the related predicates extend over a "substantial period of time." That 
omission is material and highly prejudicial because, as noted above, the checks for 
which the jury found theft extended over less than four months (December 21, 
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2007, to April 11, 2008), with one small outlier in September 2008. See p. 19, 
supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide what constitutes a 
"substantial period of time" under Hill. However, the comt looked to federal law 
in interpreting Utah's UPUAA, which was patterned after federal RICO and has 
been amended by the statute legislature to incorporate federal RI CO rulings. See 
Hill, 2009 UT 28, ,r,r 37-40. Accordingly, it is appropriate to again seek federal 
guidance on this issue. 
Federal courts "overwhelmingly" hold that a period of less than one year is 
insufficient - as a matter of law - to constitute a "substantial period of time" under 
RICO. E.g., Jackson v. BellSouthTelecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1266 (11th Cir. 
2004) ("The substantial period of time requirement for establishing closed-ended 
continuity cannot be met with allegations of schemes lasting less than a year.") 
(string citing cases); Menasco v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 684 (4th Cir.1989) 
( finding no continuity when predicate acts with a single goal occurred over a one-
year period); Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir.1994) (17 
month period insufficient to show continuity); J.D. Marshall Int'/, Inc. v. Reds tart, 
Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 821 (7th CiR.1991) (13 months is not a substantial period of 
time under RICO); Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402, 
407 (8th Cir.1999) ( 10-month period is "too short" to constitute substantial period 
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for purposes of closed-ended continuity); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 
F.2d 364, 366-67 (9th Cir.1992) ("We have found no case in which a court [of 
appeals] has held the [continuity] requirement to be satisfied by a pattern of 
activity lasting less than a year."); Efron v. Embassy Suites (P. R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 
12, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) (no closed-ended continuity where predicate acts occurred 
over 21-month period); Hughes v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 
611 {3rd Cir.1991) (12 months "is not a substantial period of time" under RICO). 
In the influential Second Circuit, the threshold is two years. First Capital 
Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 181 (2nd Cir. 2004) ("[T]his 
Court has never found a closed-ended pattern where the predicate acts spanned 
fewer than two years."); see also GICC Capital Corp. v. Tech. Fin. Group, Inc., 61 
F.3d 463, 467-68 (2d Cir.1995) (finding that courts of appeals have consistently 
considered eleven months to be insufficiently "substantial"). 
In this case, 11 of the 12 checks were written during a single three-and-one-
vo half month period, plainly not a "substantial period of time". Even if the small 
September 2008 check were thrown in ( which would be inconsistent with the 
continuity concept itself), that would bring the maximum period to less than nine 
months, again insufficient as a matter of law. 
Under the State's own Amended Information and under the jury's verdict, 
the UPUAA claim should have been dismissed. At a minimum, the jury should 
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have been instructed on the required element of a "substantial period of time." 
Either way, Didericksen's UPUAA conviction constitutes reversible error. 
B. Because wrongful appropriation is not a predicate act under 
UPUAA, reversal under Point III requires reversal of the UPUAA 
conviction. 
UPUAA can be violated only by, among other things, comm1ss10n of 
specified predicate acts. See § 7 6-10-1603. As noted, wrongful appropriation is 
not one of those. Hence, if Didericksen' s convictions are reversed to address 
wrongful appropriation, the UPUAA conviction must also be reversed. 
I 
c. Review of this issue is warranted due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, plain error, and to prevent manifest injustice. 
Didericksen's trial counsel did not seek dismissal of the UPUAA claim, or 
request a jury instruction as to the substantial period of time requirement. 
Knowledge of the law is a basic prerequisite to providing competent legal 
assistance. An attorney who does not investigate clearly relevant law has failed to 
provide effective assistance. See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Utah 
1996) (holding failure to request consolidation of theft counts was ineffective 
assistance because existing case law supported consolidation). 
The Utah Supreme Court was not presented with this specific issue in Hill 
(the acts there occurred over a five-year period), and has not been presented with 
the issue since. However, the facial insufficiency of a four-month period - or even 
nine, if the September 2008 check is included - is demonstrated by the 
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"overwhelming weight of case authority." Jackson, supra, at 1267. The failure to 
research this readily available and extensive case law, and to seek dismissal of the 
UPUAA count thereunder, was ineffective assistance. 
The error was compounded by not seeking a complete elements instruction. 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly and unambiguously adopted the "substantial 
i.il period of time" requirement for a UPUAA pattern more than four years before 
Didericksen' s trial. The failure to request an instruction on this express element 
was ineffective assistance of counsel, and the court's failure to give an instruction 
expressly required by Utah Supreme Court precedent constitutes plain error. 
Allowing Didericksen's UPUAA conviction to stand in the face of case law 
universally holding otherwise would also result in manifest injustice. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RESTITUTION AWARD. 
A. The court was required to take into account compensation 
previously received by the victims. 
As noted above, in November 2008, the Poseys entered into a Settlement 
Agreement and Release with Equity Partners, Didericksen and Bruun. Pursuant to 
the settlement and release, Equity Partners signed over the 29 acres in Saratoga 
Springs to the Poseys, along with a payment from UDOT, and the Poseys paid 
Equity Partners $25,000.00. The Poseys accepted this as compensation in full for 
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each specific check that they were questioning. Seep. 20, supra, and Add. Exh. 
F.12 
The trial court erred in refusing to take into account this prior compensation 
received by the victims when determining complete and court-ordered restitution. 
See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r 12 n.3, 82 P.3d 211 (trial court was 
obligated to factor in insurance payments received by the victim when determining 
the amount of restitution); see also State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, ,r 7, 170 P .3d 
1141 (rejecting State's argument that "limitations on civil damage awards, such as 
those imposed by the no-fault insurance statutes, should not rigidly limit restitution 
awards in criminal cases."); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 981-982 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (disagreeing with the State's argument that a court "may order 
restitution without regard to potential civil affirmative defenses," but finding that a 
release signed by victim was invalid because she had previously assigned her 
claims to the Crime Victims' Reparations Trust Fund); State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 
611, 612-613 (Utah 1985) (noting that discharge in bankruptcy would be a defense 
to some restitution claims). 
The rehabilitative purposes of restitution do not mean that victims are 
entitled to double recovery. A trial court must take into account any compensation 
12 By statute, restitution is limited to damages caused by the offenses for which the 
defendant was convicted, i.e., the 12 checks. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 
273, ,r 5, 987 P.2d 1289. 
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that the victim has already received toward his or her alleged damages, in this case 
the retitled property and UDOT payment. The trial court's refusal to do so was 
reversible error. 
B. Restitution cannot be awarded for any convictions that are 
reversed. 
To the extent that any of the convictions against Didericksen are reversed as 
urged above, the portion of the restitution award associated with those counts must 
also be reversed. 
VI. THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
As explained above, each error discussed above was material and 
vJ prejudicial. In addition, "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [] 
confidence ... that a fair trial was had." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,r 25, 999 P.2d 
7 (ellipse in original). LLC law and an operating agreement expressly addressing 
Didericksen' s authority were not interpreted, nor was the jury correctly instructed. 
Didericksen was incorrectly charged, and the jury incorrectly instructed ( or not 
instructed), regarding value and the effect of the Poseys' limited interest in the 
LLC. The jury was also not instructed on a critical lesser included offense, nor on 
a threshold element of UPUAA. The errors described above eliminate any 
perception that this trial was fair. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant Didericksen respectfully requests the 
Court reverse the judgment, and remand with instructions to dismiss all counts 
under Point I. Alternatively, the case should be remanded with instructions to 
dismiss all counts under Points II and III except counts 2, 7, 8, and 24, which 
should be remanded for a new trial, and the UPUAA count should be dismissed as 
discussed in Point IV. The restitution award should concomitantly be reversed, 
and for the additional reasons stated in Point V. 
DATED this 13th day of May, 2015. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
/~11£( CJJ1~ 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
Plaintiff, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. 
JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
Defendant. 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jacquelc 
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, JACOBS 
Defendant 
Case No: 111903467 FS 
Judge: 
Date: 
KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN 
January 17, 2014 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DIUMENTI JR, GEORGES 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 12, 1948 
Audio 
Tape Number: W43 Tape Count: 9:27 
CHARGES 
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
3. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
4. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
5. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
7. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
8. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
15. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
19. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Printed: 12/11/14 15:20:33 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
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Case No: 111903467 Date: Jan 17, 2014 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
21. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
22. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
24. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 
28. THEFT - Class A Misdemeanor 
.,-- -... 
°' 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
29. PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
HEARING 
The defendant is sentenced. 
Defense counsels state the Restitution amount is in dispute and 
disagreement. 
Set Restitution Hearing on 02/21/14 at 2:00 pm. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 111903467 Date: Jan 17, 2014 
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Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
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Case No: 111903467 Date: Jan 17, 2014 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class A Misdemeanor, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed one year 
in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Defendant is ordered to serve 1 year concurrent at the Salt Lake County 
Jail, taken forthwith. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 60 month(s). 
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Case No: 111903467 Date: Jan 17, 2014 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and Parole. 
If supervised by Adult Probation and Parole: all fines, fees and/or 
restitution are to be paid directly to Adult Probation and Parole. 
Pay monthly supervision fee as determined by probation agency. 
Pay restitution in amount{s) as determined by prosecutor or probation 
agency. 
Complete 150 hours of community service. 
Defendant is not to obtain any employment with fiduciary 
responsibilities. 
Defendant is not to have any contact with the Posey•s. 
Set Restitution Hearing on 02/21/14 at 2:00 pm. 
Defendant to serve 1 year in the Salt Lake County Jail, taken forthwith. 
RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/21/2014 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W43 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN 
Date: 
KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN 
District Court Judge 
Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary 
communicative aids and services) should call Third District Court-Salt 
Lake at (801)238-7500 three days prior to the hearing. For TTY service 
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Case No: 111903467 Date: Jan 17, 2014 
call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general information phone number is 
(801)238-7300. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
Defendant. 
PRESENT 
Clerk: melodys 
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, JACOBS 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
NOTICE 
Case No: 111903467 FS 
Judge: 
Date: February 21, 2014 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DIUMENTI JR, GEORGES 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 12, 1948 
Audio 
Tape Number: W43 Tape Count: 1.58 
CHARGES 
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
3. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
4. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
5. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
7. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
a. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
15. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
19. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/201~ Guilty 
21. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
22. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
24. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
28. THEFT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
29. PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty 
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Case No: 111903467 Date: Feb 21, 2014 
HEARING 
Mr. Thompson addresses the Court. 
2.06 
Mr. Taylor addresses the Court. 
2.24 
Mr. Thompson responds. 
2.28 
Court orders restitution in the amount of $189,574.33. Restitution 
is joint and several with Allan Bruun 111903468. 
Restitution is complete and court ordered restitution. AP&P to 
monitor payments. 
Review hearing is set. 
RESTITUTION REVIEW is scheduled. 
Date: 03/27/2015 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W43 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN 
Before Judge: 
Date: 
Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary 
communicative aids and services) should call Third District 
Court-Salt Lake at (801)238-7500 three days ·prior to the hearing. 
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general 
information phone number is (801)238-7300. 
Printed: 02/21/14 14:40:59 Page 2 (last) 
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Utah Code § 48-2c-803. Management by members. 
In a member-managed company, each member shall be subject to the duties 
described in Section 48-2c-807 and, unless otherwise provided in this chapter, in 
the articles of organization, or an operating agreement: 
( 1) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding a 
majority of profits interests in the company shall be required to decide 
any matter connected with the business of the company; 
(2) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of all members shall be 
required to: 
(a) amend the articles of organization, except to make ministerial 
amendments including: 
(i) amendments made only to reflect actions previously 
taken with the requisite approval, such as a change in 
managers; or 
(ii) to change an address; 
(b) amend the operating agreement, except to make ministerial 
amendments, including: 
(i) amendments made only to reflect actions previously 
taken with the requisite approval, such as a change in 
managers; or 
(ii) to change an address; or 
(c) (i) authorize a member or any other person to do any act on 
behalf of the company that contravenes the articles of 
organization or operating agreement; and 
(ii) after authorizing an act under Subsection (2)( c )(i) to 
terminate the authority so granted; and 
(3) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding 2/3 of 
the profits interests in the company shall be required to bind the 
company to any of the following actions: 
(a) (i) authorizing a member or any other person to do any act 
on behalf of the company that is not in the ordinary 
course of the company's business, or business of the kind 
carried on by the company; and 
(ii) after authorizing an act under Subsection (3)(a)(i) to 
terminate the authority so granted; 
(b) making a current distribution to members; 
( c) resolving any dispute connected with the usual and regular 
course of the company's business; 
( d) making a substantial change in the business purpose of the 
company; 
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(e) a conversion of the company to another entity; 
( f) a merger in which the company is a party to the merger; 
(g) any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or 
substantially all of the company's property other than in the 
usual and regular course of the company's business; 
(h) any mortgage, pledge, dedication to the repayment of 
indebtedness, whether with or without recourse, or other 
encumbering of all or substantially all of the company's 
property other than in the usual and regular course of the 
company's business; or 
(i) any waiver of a liability of a member under Section 48-2c-603. 
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Utah Code §48-2c-804. Management by managers. 
In a manager-managed company, each manager and each member shall be 
subject to Section 48-2c-807 and: 
( 1) (a) the initial managers shall be designated in the articles of 
organization; 
and 
(b) after the initial managers, the managers shall be those persons 
identified in documents filed with the division including: 
(i) amendments to the articles of organization; 
(ii) the annual reports required under Section 48-2c-203; and 
(iii) the statements required or permitted under Section 48-2c-
122 · 
' (2) when there is a change in the management structure from a member-
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
managed company to a manager-managed company, the managers 
shall be those persons identified in the certificate of amendment to the 
articles of organization that makes the change; 
each manager who is a natural person must have attained the age of 
majority under the laws of this state; 
no manager shall have authority to do any act in contravention of the 
articles of organization or the operating agreement, except as provided 
in Subsection ( 6)(g); 
a manager who is also a member shall have all of the rights of a 
member; 
unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating 
agreement of the company: 
(a) except for the initial managers, each manager shall be elected at 
any time by the members holding at least a majority of the 
profits interests in the company, and any vacancy occurring in 
the position of manager shall be filled in the same manner; 
(b) the number of managers: 
(i) shall be fixed by the members in the operating 
agreement; or 
(ii) shall be the number designated by members holding at 
least a majority of the profits interests in the company if 
the operating agreement fails to designate the number of 
managers; 
(c) each manager shall serve until the earliest to occur of: 
(i) the manager's death, withdrawal, or removal; 
(ii) an event described in Subsection 48-2c-708( 1 )(f); or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(iii) if membership in the company is a condition to being a 
manager, an event described in Subsection 48-2c-
708(1)(d) or (e); 
( d) a manager need not be a member of the company or a resident 
of this state; 
( e) any manager may be removed with or without cause by the 
members, at any time, by the decision of members owning a 
majority of the profits interests in the company; 
(f) there shall be only one class of managers; and 
(g) approval by: 
(i) all of the members and all of the managers shall be 
required for matters described in Subsection 48-2c-
803(2); and 
(ii) members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the 
company, and 2/3 of the managers shall be required for 
all matters described in Subsection 48-2c-803(3). 
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Utah Code § 76-1-302. Time limitations for prosecution of offenses . . . 
~ Commencement of prosecution. 
( 1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: ... (b) a misdemeanor 
other than negligent homicide shall be commenced within two years 
after it is committed[.] 
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Utah Code § 76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation - penalties. 
( 1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent 
of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily 
appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the 
owner or legal custodian of possession of the property. 
* * * 
( 4) Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of 
theft under Section 76-6-404. 
f . 
' i. ,,_, 
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Utah Code§ 77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
( 1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, 
questions of fact by the jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law 
as well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the 
court. 
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Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(6). Definitions [Crime Victims Restitution Act]. 
"Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or 
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of 
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and 
includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and 
suffering. 
I~ 
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Utah Code § 77-38a-302(1) and (2) 
(1) 
(2) 
When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, 
the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of 
crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the 
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. 
For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate 
a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after 
sentencing. 
( c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (5) .... 
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Operating Agreement 
for 
Tivoli Properties, LLC 
A Utah Limited Liability Company 
THIS OPERATING AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of August 15, 2007 by and among 
Equity Partners, LLC and Kerry R. and Bobbie M. Posey, ie; Tivoli Properties LLC, a Utah LLC (the 
"Company'') and the persons executing this Operating Agreement as Members of the Company and all of 
those who shall hereafter be admitted as Members (individually, a "Member" and collectively, the 
"Members") whose names and signatures shall appear on "ME\.rBER LISTING; CAPITAL 
CONTR.IBUTIO:'{S,'' belo\v, hereby agree as follows: 
\VITNESSETH: 
I. Whereas, the Members desire to enter into this agreement ('~Operating Agreement") or 
r·Agreement .. ) for the purposes of governing the Company, to and for the sole purpose of investing in, 
· purchasing. selling, granting, or taking an option on lands for investment purposes and/or development. .. 
The Company shall not conduct any other business unless related to the business, unless approved by 
unanimous consent of all Members. 
2. \.v11ereas, a limited liability company was fonned in accordance with the provisions of 
the Utah Limited Liability Company Act (the "Act") under the name of Tivoli Properties, LLC (the 
"Company") pursuant to a Certificate of Formation filed November 1 l, 2007, with the Utah Division of 
Corporation. This Operating Agreement of the Company was entered into as of that same date. 
3. Whereas, the Members intend to operate the Company, appoint a person or persons to assume 
responsibility for certain management matters (che "Manager") and provide for the restriction on the 
transfers of ownership interests in the Company ("Interests"). 
NO\V, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual premises below, and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is agreed as 
follows: 
I. DEFINITIONS 
1.1 Scope. For purposes of this Agreement, unless the language or context clearly indicates that 
a different meaning is intended, the following capitalized tenns shall have the meanings specified in this 
Article. 
1.2. Defined Terms. 
t.::U. "Act" means the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act and any successor 
statute, as amended from time to time. 
1.2.2. "Agreement'~ means this Operating Agreement, including any amendments, 
supplements, or modifications thereto. 
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1.2.3. u Articles,, means the articles of organization filed with the Utah Department of 
Conunerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, to organize the Company as a limited 
liability company, including any amendments. 
1.2.4 "Available Funds" means the Company's gross cash receipts from operations. less 
the sum of: (a) payments of principal. interest, charges, and fees pertaining to the Company's 
indebtedness; (bO expenditures incurred incident to the usual conduct of the Company's business, 
including with out limitation the ~fanager compensation payments made pursuant to Article 7.9; and~-) 
amounts reserved to meet the reasonable needs of the Co~pany's business in the future as detennined by 
the Manager in its sole discretion. 
1.2.5 "Capital Accounf' of a i\lember means the capital account maintained for the 
Member in accordance with Article II. paragraph 5. 
1.2.6 "Code" means the internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
1.2. 7 ''Company'' means Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company. 
l .2.8. "Loan,, means the acquisition and development loan obtained by Equity Partners, 
LLC from a third party lending institution to finance the acquisition and development of the Propeny. 
1.2.9 ''Loss" means. for any given tax year, the Company's loss for such tax year, as 
detem1ined in accordance with accounting principles appropriate to the Company's method of accounting 
and consistently applied. 
l .2.10. "i\fanager" means a Person, Persons or Committee, whether or not consisting of 
a Member, Members or not, who is vested with authority to manage the Company in accordance with 
Article VII. 
l .2.11. "i\lember" means an initial member of the Company and any Person who is 
subsequently admitted as an additional or substitute member of the Company pursuant to the tem1s of this 
Agreement. 
1.2. l 2 "Membership Interest" or "Interest" means a Member's percentage interest in 
the Company, consisting of the Member's right to share in Profits, receive distributions, participate in the 
Company's governance, approve the Company's acts, participate in the designation and removal of a 
Manager, and receive infonnation pertaining to the Company's affairs. The Membership lnterests of the 
initial Members are set forth in Article 3.3. Changes in Membership Interests after the date of this 
Agreement, including those necessitated by the admission and dissociation of Members, will be reflected 
in the Company's records. The a11ocation of Membership Interests reflected in the Company's records 
from time to time is presumed to be co1Tect for all purposes of this Agreement and the Act. Except as 
expressly provided otherwise herein, with respect to the interest of a Transferee, "Interest" or 
"Membership Interest'" means a Transferee's percentage interest in distributions from the Company; 
provided that nothing in this sentence shall be interpreted to grant to a Transferee the right to vote on or 
otherwise participate in any matter as a Member hereunder other than the right to receive distributions as 
set forth in Article 6.1.5. 
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1..2.13. "Net Investment'' means, with respect to each Member and as of any given date 
of deremunation, the aggregate amount of cash capital contributions actually paid to and received by the 
Company from such Member less all amounts of Available Funds distributed co such Member by the 
Company \Vith respect co such Member's ~lembership Interest. 
1.2.14. "Person" means any individual, association, cooperative, corporation, trust, 
partnership. joinc venture, limited liability company, or other legal entity. 
1.2.15. "Profif' means, with respect lo any given tax year: the Company's income for 
such tax year, as determined in accordance with accounting principles appropriate to the Company's 
method of accounting and consistently applied. 
1.2.16. "Purchase Agreement" means that certain Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
entered into by and among Equity Partners, LLC, as buyer, and Poseys as Seller, pursuant to which Seller 
has agreed to sell and Equity Partners, LLC has agreed to purchase, the Property, as such contract is 
amended from time lo time. 
l.2.17 "Regulations" means proposed, temporary, or final regulations promulgated 
under the Code by the Department of the Treasury, as amended. 
l .2.18 "Seller" means, collectively, Kerry R. Posey, both individually and as a trustee of 
the Kerry R. Posey Charitable Remainder Unitrust, and Bobbie M. Posey, both individually and as trustee 
of the Bobbie M. Posey Charitable Remainder Unitrust, in each case in such individual's or trustee's 
capacity as a seller under the Purchase Agreement. 
l .2.19. "Property" means approximately 29 acres of real property located in Utah 
County, Utah, held by Seller, Assessor Parcel Numbers 58-035-0029 and 58-035-0030, which real 
property is the subject of the Purchase Agreement. 
1.2.20 "Developer" means, Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, 
established to manage, improve, subdivide, develop, lease, and sell the Property and to perform all other 
activities reasonably related thereto. 
1.2.21 "Transfer" means, with respect to an Interest, a sale, pledge, encumbrance, lien, 
assignment, subordinate, gift or any other disposition, direct or indirect, by i'v[ember, whether voluntary, 
involuntary, or by operation of law; provided, however, that the tenn .. Transfer" shall not include a 
redemption of all or part of a member's Membership Interest by the Company. 
1.2.22. "Transferee" means a Person who acquires a Membership Interest by Transfer 
from a Member or another Transferee and is not admitted as a Member in accordance with the Agreement.. 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, a Transferee shall not have the rights of a Member set 
forth in Article l .2.1 l, other than the right to receive distributions as set forth herein. 
1.2.23. ''Sharing Ratio" shall mean the percentage representing the ratio that the 
number of Units owned by a Member bears to the aggregate number of Units owned by all of the 
Members. Upon the issuance of additional Units or the transfer, repurchase or cancellation of any 
outstanding Units, the Sharing Ratios of the Members shall be recalculated as of the date of such issuance, 
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transfer, repurchase or cancellation. The recalculated Sharing Ratio of each t\.·Iember shall be the 
percentage representing the ratio that the number of Units owned by the Member bears to the aggregate 
number of Units owned by all of the l\.lembers after giving effect to the issuance, transfer, repurchase or 
cancellation. 
1.2.24. "Unit" shall mean an equity interest in the Company. The Company shall have 
tvio classes of Units: Class A and Class B. The two classes of Units shall be identical in all respects 
except for their respective Voting Interests. The number or Units owned by each i\1lember shall be 
determined in connection with the issuance of a membership interest in the Company in exchange for the 
capital contribution made by such Member. Cnitially the Units shall not be represemed by certificates. [f 
the tvianagement Committee determines that it is in the interest of the Company to issue certificates 
representing the Units, certificates shall be issued and the Units shall be represented by such certificates. 
The Company is authorized co issue 1,000,000,000 Class A Units and 200,000,000 Class B Units. 
l .2.25 "Voting Interest" (a) With respect to the Class A Units, "Voting Interest" shall 
mean that number of Class A Units held by a Member, and (b) with respect to the Class B Units, "Voting 
Interest" shall mean that number of Class B Units held by a Member divided by l 0. 
II. ORGANIZATION 
2.1. Formation of the Companv. The Company has been organized as a Utah Limited Liability 
Company pursuant to the Act. The rights and obligations of the Members shall be as set forth in the Act 
unless the Articles or this Agreement expressly provide othenvise, in which case the provisions of the 
Articles or this Agreement shall control. 
2.2. Name of the Companv. The name of the Company shall be: TIVOLI PROPERTIES, 
L.L.C. and all Company business shall be conducted in that name or such other name the Members may 
select from time to time and which is in compliance with applicable laws. 
2.3. Registered Agent and Location of Records. The registered agent and registered office of 
the Company in the State of Utah shall be the initial registered agent and registered office set f011h in the 
Articles or such other Person or location, as the case may be, as the Manager may designate from time to 
time. The records of the Company required to be maintained by the Act shall be kept at the designated 
office identified in the Articles, or at such other designated office as the Manager may designate from 
time to time, consistent with the Act. 
2.4. Purposes of the Companv. The Company is organized for the purpose of carrying on the 
business of acquiring, managing, improving. subdividing, developing, leasing and selling the Property or 
any other enterprise that members may mutually agree upon. 
2.5. Fiscal vear, accounting. The Company's fiscal year shall be the calendar year. the pa1ticular 
accounting methods and principals to be followed by the Company shall be selected by the accountant for 
the Company ('' Accountant'') who is hereby designated as Dallas Cooke. CPA as the independent CPA 
fim1, The CPA Accountant may be changed by written Notice of the then serving Manager, consented to 
in writing by at least Two {2) Members. 
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2.6. Reports. The Managers shall provide reports concerning the financial condition and results 
of operation of the Company and the Capital Accounts of the Members to the Members in rhe time, 
manner, and fom1 as the Manager determines. Such reports shall be provided at least annually as soon as 
practible after the end of each calendar year and shall include a statement of each Member's share of 
profits and other items of income, gain, loss, deduction and credit. 
2. 7. Term of Existence. The company shall begin on 15th day of August, 2007, and shall 
continue until dissolved by mutual consent or by a 30 day notice in writing on the part of the person or 
persons desiring to withdraw to the other member or members of the company, and the member or 
members desiring to withdraw shall first offer all his right, title and interest in the company and assets 
thereof to the other member or members at a valuation to be determined by three disinterested persons, 
one of whom shall be named by the member or members desiring to withdraw, one by the remaining 
member or members and the third by the two so chosen. 
III. CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
3.1 Initial Capital Contributions. The Members shall make the following initial capital 
contributions to the Company, in cash, services, or property, in the following amounts: 
3.1.1. Contributions from Equity Partners. Equity Partners shall contribute and 
assign to the Company all of Equity Partners' right, title, and interest as buyer in, to, and under the 
Purchase Agreement and the Company shall assume and shall perfom1 all of Equity Partners obligations 
as buyer thereunder. Furthem10re, Equity Partners \Vill arrange for, sign and guarantee an interim loan in 
the amount of Seven Hundred-Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000.00) which will be used as operating 
capital for the Company. Additionally, all amounts paid by Equity Partners pursuant to the entitlement 
process, Purchase Agreement or otherwise related to the acquisition and development of the Property, 
whether paid prior to or after the execution of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be capital contributions 
made to the Company by Equity Partners. As of the date of this Agreement, the aggregate amount of such 
deemed capital contribution made by Equity Partners to the Company $800,000.00. Once the Loan is 
obtained, Equity Partners shall set aside and pay $10,000.00 per month to the Sellers from the operating 
capital of the Company. As a result of such contribution, Equity Partners has been credited with a capita) 
account equal to SS00,000.00, and has received 800,000 Class A Units. 
3.1.2 Contribution from Kerrv R. Pusev. Kerry R. Pu~e:y shall contribute the carrying 
costs of his subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One Hundred 
Seventy-five Thousand Dollars (5175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the Company 
by Kerry R. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Kerry R. Posey has been credited with a capital 
account equal to S 125,000.00, and has received l 00,000 Class A Units and 25,000 Class 8 Units. 
3.1.3 Contribution from Bobbie M. Posey. Bobbie M .. Posey shall contribute the 
carrying costs of her subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One 
l.fP Hundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars (S 175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the 
Company by Bobbie M. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Bobbie tvf. Posey has been credited with 
a capital account equal to S 125,000.00, and has received I 00,000 Class A Units and 25,000 Class B Units 
3.2 Initial Commitments and Contributions. By the execution of this Operating Agreement, 
the initial Members hereby agree to make the capital contributions set forth herein. The interests of the 
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respective Members in the total capital of the Company {their respective "Sharing Ratios", as adjusted 
from time to time to reflect changes in the Capital Accounts of the Members and the total capital in the 
Company). Any additional Member (other than an assignee of a Membership [nterest who has been 
admitted as a Member) on any capital contribution except as provided in this Operating Agreement. 
3.3 Allocation of Membership Interest, As a result of the transactions described above, the 
Members own the number and classes of Units and have capital account balances attributable to the Units 
as set forth below: 
Member Class ''A,, Units Class "B'' Units Capital Account Balance 
Equity Partners 750,000 
-0- $750,000 
Kerry R. Posey 100,000 25,000 S125,000 
Bobbie M. Posey 100,000 25,000 $125,000 
Based on the above, the initial Sharing Ratio of Equity Partners is 75%, and the initial Sharing Ratio of 
Kerry R. and Bobbie M. Posey is 12.5% each. 
3.4 Subsequent Capital Contributions No Member shall be obligated to make any capital 
contributions to the Company other than those set forth herein, except as the Company and such Member 
may agree in writing. 
3.5 Failure to Contribute. [f any member fails to make a capital contribuLion when required, the 
Company may, in addition to the other rights and remedies the Company may have under the Act or 
applicable law, take such enforcement action (including, the commencement and prosecution of court 
proceedings) against such Member as the Managers consider appropriate. Moreover, the remaining 
Members may elect to contribute the amount of such required capital themselves according to their 
respective Sharing Ratios. fn such an event, the remaining Members shall be entitled to treat such amounts 
as an extension of credit to such defaulting Memher, pt1yt1hle upon demand, with interest accruing thereon 
at the federal midtenn rate provided for under Code Sec. l 274(d), plus Two Percent (2%) until paid, all of 
which shall be secured by such defaulting Member's interest in the Company, each Member who may 
hereafter default, hereby granting to each Member who may hereafter grant such an extension of credit, a 
security interest in such defaulting Member's interest in the Company. 
3.6 Return of Capital Contributions. Except as expressly provided herein, each Member 
agrees not to withdraw as a Member of the Company and no Member shall be entitled to the return of an 
part of his or her capital contributions or to be paid interest in respect to either his or her Capital Account 
or his or her capital contributions. 
3. 7 Capital Accounts of the Members. Separate Capital Accounts for each tvlember shall be 
maintained by the Company. Each Member's Capital Account shall reflect the Member's capital 
contributions and increases for the Member's share of any net income or gain of the Company. Each 
Member's Capital Account shall also reflect decreases for distributions made to the Member and the 
Member's share of any losses and deductions of the Company. 
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3. 7. 1. Each Member's Capital Account may be increased by: 
(i) The amount of money contributed by the Member to the Company. 
(ii) The fair market value of propeny contributed by the Member to the Company(net of 
liabilities secured by such contributed property that the Company is considered to assume 
or take subject to under Code Sec ... [f any property, other than cash, is contributed to or 
distributed by the Company, the adjustments to Capital accounts required by Treasury 
Regulation Sec ... shall be made. 
(iii) The Member's share of the increase in the tax basis of Company property, if any, 
arising out of the recapture of any tax credit. 
V. MEMBERS 
5.1 Initial Memben. The initial Members of the Company are the Persons executing this 
Agreement as Members as of the date first set forth above, each of which is admitted to the Company as a 
Member effective contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement by such person. 
5.2 Member Compensation. The members shall be paid such salaries as may be agreed upon 
which will be charged as an expense of the business. 
5 .2.1 The salaries so paid, as provided hereof, shall not be considered as part of the 
profits to which said parties shall be entitled. 
5.3 Rights and duties of the Members. 
5.3. l Allocation. Each of the members shall be entitled to the net profits of the 
business, as well as the losses happening in the course of the business which shall be 
borne by each member. Such shall be borne in the same proportions as their respective 
company ownership, unless the same shall happen through the wilful neglect or default 
and not the mistake or error) of either of the members. In which case the loss so incurred 
shall be made good by the member through whose neglect or default such losses shall 
arise. 
5.3.2. Distributions. The Managers may make distributions to the Members from time 
to time. Distributions may be made only after the Managers detennine in their reasonable 
judgement, that the Company has sufficient cash on hand which exceeds the current and 
the anticipated needs of the Company to fulfill its business purposes (including needs for 
operating expenses, debt service, acquisitions, reserves, and mandatory distributions, if 
any). All distributions shall be made to the Members in accordance with their Sharing 
Ratios. Distributions shall be in cash or property or particularly in both, as detennined by 
the Managers. No distribution shall be declared or made if, after giving it effect, the 
Company would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of 
business or the Company's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities 
plus, the amount that would be needed if the Company were to be dissolved at the time of 
the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights of other Members upon dissolution that 
are superior to the rights of the Members receiving the distribution. 
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5.3.3. Familv Partnership Savings Provision. Notwithstanding anything in this 
Operating Agreement to the contrary, should any provision of this Operating Agreemenc, 
or any act of the parties, result in violation of the family partnership provisions of Code 
Sec. 704(e) or the regulations and cases thereunder, the Managers may amend this 
Agreement, or take any other actions reasonably necessary to prevent such violation. or to 
correct such violation. 
5.3.4. Other business ln view of the fact that all the Members are engaged in other 
business ventures, no member shall be bound to devote all of his time to the affairs of the 
company but he shall devote at least a part of his working time to the affairs of the 
company business and when the demands of the business shall warrant, he agrees to give 
his entire working time to the business. 
5.3.5 Conduct of the Con10am· Any questions regarding the conduct of the Company 
business shall be determined by a vote of 100% of the Managing Members of the 
Company. 
5.3.6 Business Continuation. The expulsion of any Member shall not dissolve the 
Company as to other Members, and the remaining Members shall have right to continue 
the Company business by themselves or in conjunction \vith any other person or persons 
they might select. 
5.3. 7 \Vithdrawal The Members shall have the right lo retire or withdraw from the 
Company, and this Agreement may be terminated as to one or more Members and new 
members may be admitted under the provisions hereinafter set forth, but neither such 
retirement, withdrawal, tennination, death of any Member, or admission of any new 
1\-lember shall dissolve this Company. 
5.3.8 Selling of Members Interest Should one or more of the members desire to sell 
his or their interest in the company or to withdraw from th,:- compnny hr. or they ~halJ do 
so upon the following tenns: 
(i) He or they shall give to the remaining member or members 30 days' written 
noc ice of such intention and shall, if the other member or members indicates 
willingness to buy within such 30 days, sell to the remaining member or members 
his or their interest in the company for an amount equal to the value of the interest 
or interests according to standard accounting procedure. [n the valuation of the 
interest, market value, not book value: is to be considered; nor is goodwill to be 
considered as an asset. 
(ii) The selling member or members shall accept payment for his or their interest 
in cash to be paid within 45 days from the giving of a notice of acceptance by the 
remaining member or members. 
(iii) The option to purchase may be exercised by the remaining members, if more 
than one, in equal proportion, or, if one of them fails to exercise his option and 
the others do not fail to do so, the latter shall have the right to purchase the whole 
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of the selling member's or members' interest. The selling member or members 
shall not be required to sell unless their entire interest in purchased. 
(iv) Should there be any disagreement by the members as to the value of the 
interest of the selling member or members, the selling member or members shall 
appoint an arbitrator and the buying member or members shall appoint another 
and if these two arbitrators are unable to agree, the two shall appoint a third 
arbitrator, and the value of selhng member's or members' interest fixed by said 
arbitrators or any two of them shall detenuine the purchase price. All parties 
agree to be bound by such decision of the arbitrators. 
5.4. i\lanner of Acting Among Members 
following: 
5.4.1. No Member shall, without consent in writing of the other Members, do any of the 
(i). Assign his share or interest in the Company. 
(ii) Except by will, no Member shall sell, pledge or in any way encumber his or her 
interest in the Company without written consent of all other Members. 
(iii) Without the consent of all the other Members or Member, draw, accept, or sign any 
bill of exchange or promissory note, or contract any debt on account of the Company, or 
employ any of the money or effects thereof, or in any manner pledge the credit thereof, 
except in the usual an regular course of business. Any infraction of this pro~·ision shall be 
a ground for an immediate dissolution of the Company as regards that Member so 
offending, and the other Members may forthwith declare the same dissolved by a written 
notice to the offending Member, or left for him at the office of the Company. 
(iv) Without the consent of all the other Members or Member, compound, release, or 
discharge any debt which shall be due or owing to the Company, without receiving the 
full amount thereof. Any infraction of this provision shall be a ground for an immediate 
dissolution of the Company as regards that Member so offending, and the other Members 
may forthwith declare the same dissolved by a wrillc::11 riolice to the offending Member, ur 
left for him at the office of the Company. 
(v) Lend any money, or give credit to, or have dealings on behalf of the Company, with 
any person, company, or corporation whom the other Members or Member shall have 
forbidden him to trust or deal with; and if he shall act contrary to this provision he shall 
repay to the Company any loss which may have been incurred thereby. 
(vi) Hire or dismiss, except in case of gross misconduct, any clerk or other person in the 
employment of the Company, without the consent of all the other Members. 
(vii) Give their signature separately or collectively on behalf of the company or any 
i\·lember thereof, except for legitimate business purposes and \.Vith the consent of l 00% of 
the other Members of the Company. 
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(viii) Without the previous consent in writing of all the other i'vkmbers, enter into any 
bond. or become bail, surety, or security, for any person. 
(ix) Buy, ordert or contract for any article exceeding the value of S500.00 dollars, without 
the previous consent in writing of all the other Members; and in case he or she does so~ 
the other Members shall have the option to take the goods or articles so bought, ordered, 
or contracted for, on behalf of the Company, or to leave the same for the separate use of 
the i\.kmber so buying, ordering, or contracting, to be paid for out of his or her own 
money. 
(x) Have the right to embark in any speculative transactions involving the Company 
without the consent of all the other Members. 
(xi) Di\,ulge to any person not a ivlember of the Company any trade secret connected with 
the Company business that shall come to his or her knowledge by reason of his or her 
being a Member, during the continuance of this Company and for five (5) years after its 
tennination. 
(xii) With the approval of all the other Members and consent of the all ivlembers, any 
Member shall be entitled to purchase any goods carried by the Company at actual invoice 
price, plus the freight. 
5.4.2 Meetings. An ammal meeting of ~·[embers for the transaction of such business as 
may properly come before the Meeting, shall be held at such place, on such date and at 
such time as the Managers shall detennine. Special meetings of Members for any proper 
purpose or purposes may be called at any time by the Managers or the holders of at least 
Ten Percent(l0%) of the Sharing Ratios of all Members. The Company shall deliver or 
mail written Notice stating the date, time , place, and purposes of any meeting to each 
Member entitled to vote at the meeting. Such Notice shall be given not less than Ten( 10) 
and no more than Sixty(60) days before the date of the meeting. All meetings of Members 
shall be presided over by a Chairperson who shall be a Manager. A Member may 
participate and vote at such meeting via phone conference call. 
5.4.3. Consent. Any action required or permitted to be taken at an annual or special 
meeting of the Members may be taken without a meeting, without prior Notice, and 
without a vote, if consents in writing, setting forth the action so taken, are signed by the 
Members having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to 
authorize or take action were present and voted. Every written consent shall bear the dale 
and signature of each Member who signs the consent. Prompt Notice of the taking of 
action \vithout a meeting by less than unanimous written consent shall be given to all 
Members who have not consented in writing to such action. 
5.4.4 \'oting Rights. Each member shall have a number of votes equal to such 
Member's Membership Interest in the Company. 
5.4.4.1 Required Vote. Except with respect to matters for which a greater 
minimum vote is required by the Act or this Agreement, the vote of Members 
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whose aggregate ~-Iembership [merest exceeds 50°:o of the aggregate t\-Iembership Interest 
of all Members present binds the Company. 
VI. TER~Il~ATION OR DISSOLCTlON 
6.1 Accounting. Upon the dissolution of the Company a full and general account of the 
assets. liabilities. and transactions of the Company shall be taken, and the assets and propert.y 
thereof shall, as soon as practicable, be sold, the debts due the Company collected, the proceeds 
applied, first, in discharge of the liabilities of the company and the expenses of liquidating the 
same; and next in payment to each Member or his or her representatives of any unpaid interest or 
profits belonging to him or her, and of his or her share of the capital; and the surplus, if any, shall 
be divided between the Members or their representatives in equal shares; and the Members or 
their representatives shall execute all such instruments for facilitating the collection and division 
of the Company, and for their mutual indemnity and release, as may be requisite or proper. 
6.2 Distribution. The Members agree that the detemunation of the amount to be paid 
to either Member shall be detennined by the auditor or certified public accountant then 
employed by the company, and such computation shall be final and conclusive upon them. 
6.3. Goodwill On the te1mination or dissolution of the Company or the death or 
retirement therefrom of a Member, neither the goodwill of the Company nor the right to the use of 
the finn name shall be considered as an asset of the Company, nor shall any value be placed 
thereon for the purpose of accounting or distribution. 
6.4 Death of Member Upon the death of any Member, the Company shall immediately 
cease as to him or her, but shall continue as to the survivors in accordance with the tenns and 
conditions hereinafter set forth. 
(i). Upon the death of any Member, the surviving Members shall have the right to 
purchase the interest of the deceased Member at the appraised value reached by appraisers 
selected as herein stated. 
(ii) If the surviving Members do not desire to purchase the interest of the deceased 
Member, they shall have the right to continue to operate the Company business so long as 
it shows a profit; and accurate records shall be kept and frequent audits made to ascertain 
whether a profit is being made for a term of one year. In this event the profits of the 
deceased Member shall be paid to his or her legal representative or representatives in 
semiannual installments. 
(iii) After the term of one year without the surviving Members purchase of the interest of 
the deceased Member, an account and statement shall be taken and made out of his or her 
share of the capital and effects of the Company, and of aH unpaid interest and profits 
belonging to him or her up to the time of his decease plus the year extension, for which 
purpose a valuation shall be made of any assets or effects requiring valuation, and the 
amount so ascertained to be due and O\Ving to the deceased Member shall be paid by the 
surviving Members to his or her representatives within three (3) calendar months from the 
date of the one year extension from his or her decease, with interest thereon until payment 
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ac rhe rate of l O percent per annum ( l 0%); and on such payment the share of the deceased 
Member in the Company property and effects shall go and belong to the surviving 
Members in the proportions in which they shall have contributed to the purchase thereof. 
(iv) ln case of the death of a Member and of the purchase of his or her interest by the 
remaining Members as herein provided, the right to use the name of the Company and to 
carry on the business under such name shall. so far as the deceased Member is concerned, 
be the propeny of the remaining lvlembers. 
(v) [n the event the remaining Members do not perfonn under the terms set forth above in 
respect to the purchase of the deceased portion of the Company, the Company's business 
shall be wound up and liquidated in 30 days from the fore-named time limit and divided 
as herein provided. 
6.5 Bankruptcv or insolvencv of a l\Jember. If any member shall be adjudicated bankrupt, or 
insolvent, or take proceedings for liquidation by arrangement or composition with it, his or her creditors, 
the Company shall thereupon tem1inate as to it, him, or her and it, he, she, or its, his or her executors, 
administrators or assigns, as the case may be, shall have no interest in common with the surviving or other 
Members or Member in the property of the Company, but shall be considered in equity as a vendor to the 
surviving Members or Member for the share in the company of the bankrupt or liquidacing or 
compounding Member as and from the date of its, his or her bankruptcy, or insolvency, or of its, his or her 
having compounded as aforesaid, for the price and on the tenns to be a1Tived at under the provisions 
hereinbefore contained. 
6.5. l This Agreement is expressly not intended for the benefit of any creditor of the 
Company, the Manager, the Members, or any other Person. Except and only to the extent 
provided by applicable statute, no such creditor or third party shall have any rights under 
this Agreement. No third person shall under any circumstances have any right to compel 
any actions or payments by the Company, any Manager, or any Member. 
VII. BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY 
7.1 Business of the Companv. (a) Equity Partners, LLC ("EP") shall have full, exclusive and 
complete authority and discretion in the management and control of the business of the Company for the 
purposes herein stated and shall make all decisions affecting the business of the Company. At such, any 
action taken shall constitute the act of, and serve to bind, the Company. EP shall manage and control the 
affairs of the Company to the best of its ability and shall use its best efforts to carry out the business of the 
Company and will be compensated for providing various services. 
(b) The expenses so paid, as provided hereof, shall not be considered as part of the 
profits to which any of the parties shall be entitled. 
(c) All the members of the company shall fix the wages or salaries to be paid to any of 
the members of the company, and shall be binding upon all. 
(d) The Company has retained Four Winds Development Group. LLC ("Four Winds'') as 
their representative to obtain all necessary governmental permits, approvals and 
entitlements which are required to allow the improvement, development, construction and· 
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sale of the real estate property. Suc.h expenses are considered expenses of the Company 
and shall be paid by Four Winds and shall be reimbursed by the Company. 
(e) The Company shall indemnify, save ham1less, and pay all expenses, costs, or 
liabilities of any Member who for the bendit of the Company makes any deposit, acquires 
any option, or makes any other similar payment or assumes any obligation in connection 
with any property proposed to be acquired by the Company, which action shall have been 
consented to by the Company, and who suffers any financial loss as the result of such 
action. 
7.2 Change of l\.fanngers The Members from time to time may change the number of Managers 
upon the affirmative vote or \vritten consent of Members holding an aggregate ofnot less than 100% of 
the outstanding Membership Interest. 
7.3 Election of l\.Ianagers Managers shall be elected at a meeting of the Members in the case 
of a Manager vacancy. [f more than one l\.fanager is to be elected, all management positions shall be filled 
in the same election, i.e.; the candidate with the highest vote total will fill the first available position, the 
candidate with the next highest vote total will fill the next available position, and so forth. In voting for 
lvlanagers, each l'vlember shall have the number of votes equal to his, her or its Membership Interest. 
Members may cast all of their votes for one candidate, or divide their votes among multiple candidates. 
7.4. General Powers of Managers. Except as may otherwise be provided in this Operating 
Agreement, the ordinary and usual decisions concerning the business and affairs of the Company, shall be 
made by the Managers. The managers have the power, on behalf of the Company, to do all things 
necessary or convenient to carry out the business and affairs of the Company, including, the power to: 
7.4. l Purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire any real or personal property; 
Sell, convey, mortgage, grant a security interest in, pledge, lease, exchange, or othef\vise 
dispose or encumber any real or personal property; 
7.4.2 Open one or more depository accounts and make deposits into, and write checks 
and withdrawals against such accounts; 
7.4.3 Borrow money, incur liabilities, and other obligations; 
7.4.4 Enter into any and all agreements and execute any and all contracts, documents, and 
instruments relating to the Business; 
7.4.5 Engage consultants and agents, define their respective duties and establish their 
compensation or remuneration; 
7.4.6 Obtain insurance covering the Business and affairs of the Company's name; 
7.4.7 Participate with others in partnerships, joint ventures, and other associations and 
strategic alliances only where same are directly in pursuit of the Business, as de.fined 
above. 
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7.4. 7.1 There is an express limitation on the nature of the Business and the 
po\.vers granted the ivfanagers herein, the Company is intended to purchase and 
develop, hold and sale real estate for investment purposes only. and no activities 
inconsistent with such limited purposes shall be undertaken. 
7.5. Limitations. Notwithstanding the foregoing and any other provision contained in this 
Operating Agreement to the contrary, no act shall be taken, sum expended, decision made, obligation 
incurred or po·wer exercised by any Manager on behalf of the Company except by the consent of One 
Hundred percent ( l OO~·'o) of all Membership Interests with respect to: 
7.5.1 Any significant and material purchase, receipt, lease, exchange, or other acquisition 
of any real or personal property or business; 
7.5.2 The sale of all or substantially all of the assets and property of the Company; 
7 .5.3 Any mortgage, grant of security interest, pledge. or encumbrance upon all or 
substantially all of the assets and property of the Company; 
7 .5 .4 Any merger; 
7.5.5 Any amendment or restatement of the Articles or of this Operating Agreement; 
7.5.6 Any matter which could result in a change in the amount or character of the 
Company's capital; 
7.5.7 Any change in the character of the business and affairs of the Company: 
7.5.8 The commission of any act which would make it impossible for the Company to 
carry on its ordinary business and affairs; 
7.5.9 Any act that would contravene any provision of the Articles or of this Operating 
agreement or the Act. 
7.6. Standard of Care. Every Manager shall discharge his or her duties as a Manager in good 
faith, with care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, 
and in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the Company. A manager shall 
not be liable for any monetary damages to the Company for any breach of such duties except for a receipt 
of a financial benefit to which the Manager is not entitled; voting for or assenting to a distribution to 
Members in violation of this Operating Agreement. 
7.7 Tenure of Managers. Each Manager shall serve for an indefinite period, except that: (a) a 
Manager may resign at any time by giving written notice to the Members at least 30 days prior to the 
effective date of the resignation; (b) a Manager who is a natural personal shall cease to be a Manager upon 
his or her death or at such time as he or she is adjudicated incompetent; (c) a Manager who is a legal 
entity other than a natural person shall cease to be a Manager upon its dissolution or upon a change in the 
controlling ownership of such Person; {d) a Manager shall cease to be a tVfanager at such time as he or she 
files • or fails to successfully contest, a petition seeking liquidation, reorganization, arrangement, 
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readjustment, protection, relief, or composition in any state or federal bankruptcy, insolvency, 
reorganization, or receivership proceeding: and (e) if a court of competent jurisdiction removes a ~fanager 
for cause, such Manager shall cease to be a Manager upon the date of such order. 
7.8. i.Hanagers Need Not be Members. A Manager need not also be a Member. 
v; 7.9. Informal Action. Any action required or permitted to be taken by the Manager may be taken 
without a meeting if the action is evidenced by a written record describing the action taken, signed by the 
Manager. 
VIII. EXCuLPATION OF LIABILITY: INDEi\l~IFICATION 
8.1. Exculpation of Liabilitv. Unless otherwise provide by law or expressly assumed. a 
person who is a ?\·[ember or Manager, or both, shall not be liable for the acts1 debts or liabilities of the 
Company. 
8.2. Indemnification. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the Company shall indemnify 
any Manager and may indemnify any employee or agent of the Company who was or is a party or is 
threatened to be made a party to a threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether 
civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative, and whether fonnal or infom1al, other than an action by or 
in the right of the Company, by reason of the fact that such person is or was a l\'fanager, employee or agent 
of the Company against expenses, including attorney's fees, judgements, penalties, fines, and amounts 
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit or 
proceeding, if the person acted in good faith, with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position 
would exercise under similar circumstances, and in a manner that such person reasonably believed to be in 
the best interests of the Company and with respect to a criminal action or proceeding, if such person had 
no reasonable cause to believe such person1s conduct was unlawful. 
8.2.1. To the extent that a Member, employee, or agent of the Company has been 
successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of an action, suit, or proceeding or in the 
defense of any claim, issue, or other matter in the action, suit, or proceeding. such person 
shall be indemnified against actual and reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, 
incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit, or proceeding and any action: 
suil or proceeding brought to enforce the mandatory indenmification provided herein. Any 
indenmi fication pennitted under this Article, unless ordered by a court, shall be made by 
the Company only as authorized in the specific case upon a detem1ination that the 
indemnification is proper under the circumstances because the person to be indemnified 
has met the applicable standard of conduct and upon an evaluation shall be made by a 
majority vote of the Members who are not parties or threatened to be made parties to the 
action. suit, or proceeding. Notwithstanding the forgoing to the contrary, no 
indemnification shall be provided to any Manager, employee. agent of the Company for or 
in connection with the receipt of a financial benefit to which such person is not entitled, 
voting for or assenting to a distribution to Members in violation of this Operating 
Agreement or the Act, or a knowing violation of law. 
8.3 Insurance. The Company shall maintain for the protection of the Company and all of its 
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Members such insurance as rhe !v(anagemem Committee, inits sole discretion, deems necessary for the. 
operations being conducted. 
IX. AGREEi\lE~TS WITH THIRD P.-\RTIES A:'cD WITH AFFILIATES OF THE 
C01IPA~Y 
9.1. Validitv of Transactions. Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement maybe engaged co 
perfom1 services for the Company. The validity of any transaction, agreement or payment involving the 
Company and any Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement otherwise pennitted by the tenns of this 
Agreement shall not be affected by reason of the relationship between them and such Affiliates or the 
approval of said transactions: agreement or payment. 
9.2. Other Activities Any Member and the i\,·lanagers mny engage in other business ventures of 
every nature, including! without limitation by specification, the ownership of another business similar to 
that operated by the Company. Neither the Company nor any of the other Members shall have any right or 
interest in any such independent venture or to the income and profits derived therefrom. 
X. BOOKS, RECORDS, REPORTS, AND BANK ACCOUNTS. 
10.1 There shall be kept at all times, during the continuance of the company, full and correct 
books of account wherein each of the members shall enter all moneys by them or either of them received, 
paid, laid out, or expended in and about the business, as well as all goods, wares, commodities, and 
merchandise by them or either of them bought or sold, by reason or on account of the business and the 
management thereof in ;:iny wise he longing. The books shall be used in common among the members, so 
that any of them may have access thereto without an interruption or hindrance of the others. 
10.1. l The company shall operate on the basis of a calendar year. On the last day of each 
year, a general account shall be taken of the assets and liabilities of the company and of 
all dealings and transactions of the same during the then preceding calendar year or 
portion thereof. 
IO. l .2 The bankers of the firm shall be Zion's 1st National Bank or such other bankers as 
shall from time to time be agreed upon by the members, and all money and credits not 
required for current expenses shall be deposited with the bank, and all checks, drafts, bills 
of exchange, promissory notes or the like drawn thereon shall be signed one member and 
countersigned by another, and shall be of no effect unless so signed and countersigned. 
All indorsement of commercial paper by _the company shall be by the company stamp or 
name affixed by any member, and the same shall be signed by two members; and shall be 
of no effect unless so made. If any member shall give such obligation, except in the case 
aforesaid, the same shall be deemed to be given on his separate account and shall be 
payable out of his separate estate, and he shall indemnify the other member or members 
against the payment thereof. 
10. 2 Schedule K-1. On or before the 901h day following the end of each fiscal year of the 
Company's existence, the Company shall cause each Member to be furnished with a federal (and where 
applicable state) income tax reporting Schedule K-1 or its equivalent. 
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10.3 "Tnx iVlatters Partner.,, The Members shall designate a Member to rhe "Tax Matters 
Panner'' of the Company pursuant to Section 6231 (a)(7) of the Code. The Member so designated is 
authorized to take such actions as are pennitted by Sections 6221 through 6233 of the Code. The initial 
Tax Maners Partner shall be James Didericksen, in his capacity as a Member of Equity Partners. The Tax 
MaLters Partner may be removed by the rvfembers at any time with or without cause. The Tax Matters 
Partner will infonn the Members of all administrative and judicial proceedings pertaining to the 
determination of the Companfs tax items and will provide the Members with copies of all notices 
received from the Internal Revenue Service regarding the commencement of a Company-level audit or a 
proposed adjustment of any of the Company is tax items. The Company will reimburse the Tax l'vfatters 
Pa11ner for reasonable expenses properly incurred while acting within the scope of the Tax Matters 
Parcner·s authority, including, but not limited to, legal and accounting fees, claims, liabilities, losses, and 
d~mages. The payment of such expenses shall be made as an expense of the Company and before any 
di.mibutions are made to Members. The provisions related to limitation of liability and indemnification of 
the 1\-fanagers set forth in this Agreement shall be fully applicable to the Member acting as the Tax 
Matters Partner for the Company. 
XI. DISSOLUTION A~D \'1NDING UP 
11.1. Dissolution. The Company shall dissolve and its affairs shall be wound up on the firs1 to 
occur of the following events: 
(i) At any time specified in the Articles or this Operating Agreement; 
(ii) Upon the happening of any event specified in the Articles or this Operating 
Agreement; 
{iii) By the unanimous consent of all Members; 
(iv) Upon the death, withdraw I, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a Member or the 
occurrence of any other event that rem1inates the continued memberships of a Member in 
the Company unless within Ninety (90) days after the disassociation of membership~ a 
majority in interest of the remaining Members consent to continue the business of the 
Company and to the admission of one or more Members as necessary. 
11.2. Winding Up. Upon dissolution, the Company shall cease carrying on its business and 
affairs and shall conunence the winding up of the Company's business and affairs and complete the 
winding up as soon as practical. Upon the winding up of the Company, the assets of the Company shall be 
distributed first to creditors to the extent pennitted by law, in satisfaction of Company debts, liabilities, 
obligations ant then to Members and fonner Members first, in satisfaction of liabilities for distributions 
and then, in accordance with their Sharing Ratios. Such proceeds shall be paid to such Members within 
One Hundred Twenty{ 120) days after the date of winding up. 
XII. GENER~L PROVISlONS 
12.1 Formation of Companv The Company was fanned as a new venture for the purpose of 
acquiring real property for development. There can be no assurance that the real property acquired by the 
Company will be able to be developed and sold at a profit. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that 
the application of the capital contributions required hereunder and the proceeds of the Loan (if obtained 
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by Equity Partners) will be sufficient to cover the acquisition, development, and catTy costs of the real 
property acquired and held by the Company. 
12.2. Disposition of i\.'lembership Interests Every sale, assignment, transfer, exchange, 
mortgage, pledge, grant, hypothecation or other disposition of any ~1£embership [merest shall be made 
only upon compliance with this Article. No Membership Interest shall be disposed of if the disposition 
would cause a termination of the Company under Sec 708 of the Internal Revenue Code of l 986, as 
amended; without compliance with any and all state and federal securities laws and regulations; and 
unless the assignee of the Membership lnterests provides the Company with the information and 
agreements that the Managers may require in connection with such disposition, including but not limited 
to an executed counterpart of this Agreement. 
12.2.1 No Member shall be entitled to assign, convey, sell, encumber. or in any way 
alienate all or any part of its ~-lembership Interest in the Company and as a Member 
except with the prior written consent of a majority in the interest of the non-transferring 
Nlembers1 which consent may be given or withheld, conditioned, or delayed (as allowed 
by this Agreement or the Act), as the non-transferring Member~ may detennine in their 
sole discretion. Transfers in violation of this pro\'ision shall only be effective to the extent 
of an assignment of such interest with only rights set forth in the following provision 
"Pem1frted Dispositions\\. 
12.3 Permitted Dispositions. Subject to the provisions of this Article, a Member may assign 
such Member's Membership Interest in the Company in whole or part. The assignment of a Membership 
Interest does not in itself entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the Company 
or lo become a Member. Such assignee is only entitled to receive, to the extent assigned, the distributions 
the assigning Member would otherwise be entitled to, and such assignee shall only become a assignee of a 
Membership Interest and not a substitute Member. 
12.4 Acknowledgment of Access to Records. Each Member acknowledges that such Member 
has been furnished and has reviewed the Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement of the 
Company and al amendments, if any, to those documents. Each Membe1 fu1 thcr acknowledges that all 
instruments, documents, records, books, and financial infom1ation pertaining to this investment have been 
made available for inspection by such Member and it professional advisors and that the books and records 
of the Company will be available upon reasonable notice for inspection by such Member during 
reasonable business hours at the Company's principal place of business. 
12.5 Required Amendments. The Members and Managers will execute and file any 
amendments to the Articles required by the Act. If any such amendments results in inconsistencies 
between the Articles and this Agreement, this Agreement will be considered to have been amended in the 
manner necessary to eliminate the inconsistencies. 
12.6 Policies. [n every instance where agreemelll between the members does not exist \Vith 
reference to the policies to be followed by the company, the managing members shall have the right to 
decide what policy or policies shall be followed and the other member or members shall consider the 
decision as final. 
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12. 7 Additional Instruments. Each Member will execute and deliver any document or statement 
necessary to give effect to the tenns of this Agreement or to comply with any law, rule, or regulation 
governing the Company's fonnation and activities. 
12.8 Power of Attornev. Each Member appoints each ~·{ember, with full power of substitution, 
as the Member's attorney-in-fact, to act in the Member's name and to execute and file (a) all certificates, 
applications, reports, and other instruments necessary to qualify or maintain the Company as a limited 
liability company in the states and foreign countries where the Company conducts its activities, (bO all 
instruments thm effect or confin11 changes or modifications of the Company or its status, including, 
without limitation, amendments to the Articles, and;©) all instruments of transfer necessary to effect the 
Companf s dissolution and termination. The power of attorney granted by this article is irrevocable, 
coupled with an interest, will survive any incapacity of the l\:fember: and shall be binding upon the 
Member's successors and assigns. 
12. 9 Disputes. [n the event that any dispute should arise conceming any of the terms, covenants 
or conditions of this agreement, or with respect the enforcement thereof, or with respect to any dissolution 
or liquidation of the Company, or with respect to any matter affecting the operation and conduct of the 
business of the Company, such dispute shall be disposed by arbitration by submitting the same to two 
indifferent, competent persons in or t.vell acquainted with the trade or business of the company, one to be 
chosen by either party, or by an umpire to be chosen by the referees in the usual course in such or similar 
cases; and their or his decision shall, in all respects, be final and conclusive on both parties, and sl1all be 
given, in writing, within 10 days next after such submission, or within such further time, not exceeding 30 
days, as they or he shall require. 
12.10 Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire understanding and agreement 
among the parties concerning the Company and supersedes any and all prior negotiations, understandings 
or agreements in regard thereto. 
12.11. Amendment. This Agreement may not be amended nor may any rights hereunder be 
waived except by an instrument in writing signed by Members having a Sharing Ratio of more than 50% 
in the aggregate. 
12.12 Pronouns. References to a Member, including by use of a pronoun, shall be deemed to 
include masculine, feminine, singular, plural, individuals, pannerships, corporations or other legal entities 
where applicable. 
12.13 Severabilitv. [f any provision of this Agreement or the application of such provision to 
any Person or circumstance shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Agreement, or the application of 
such provision to Persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be 
affected. 
12. 14 Applicable Law. The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Agreement, 
excluding any conflict of laws rules. 
12.15 Counterparts. This instrumem may be executed in any number of counterparts each of 
\.vhich shall be considered an original. 
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12.14 Applicable Law. The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Agreement, 
excluding any conflicl of laws rules. 
12.15 Counterparts. This instrument m:1y he execmed in :rny numher of counterparts each of 
which shall be considered an original. 
12.16. Parties and Successors Bound. This agreement shall be binding upon the he? irs. 
executors, ndministracors and assigns of the. pan ies hereto and constitutes th~ entire agreement of the 
parties hac.10. and may not he amended by the parties except in writing signed by the m:1jority of the 
parties. 
12.17. Article Headings. The Article hendings and numhers comained in this Operating 
Agreement have heen inserted only as a matted of convenience and for reference~ and in no Vi-·ay shall be 
construl?d lo defin~. limit, or describe the scope otr intent of any provision of this Operating Agreemen1. 
12. 18. Amendment. This Opernting Agreement may he amendt'd or re\'oked al any time hy :1 
written agreement executed by all of the p:tnies to this Operating Agreement except where a lesser 
rercemage of Membership Interests is permitted elsewhere in this Operating Agreement. No chang~ or 
modification 10 this Operaring Agrec'.'ment shall be valid unless in writing and signed by all of rhe parti\:·s 
· to this Operating. Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hands and seals the date and year 
first ahove writ ten. 
EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC 
8#-0? 
By: __ ~-------------
lts: 
BOBBIE M. POSEY 
.:-:--F) 
// >:. ,.,-:! t,~',,( ..-/ 
I 
,.-,,r> 
(/ 
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FIRST AMENDMENT TO OPERATING AGREE:MENT FOR TIVOLI PROPERTIES, 
LLC 
A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
This First Amendment to Operating Agreement for Tivoli Properties, LLC (this 
''Amendment") is made and entered into on November 14, 2007, by and between Equity Partners, 
" LLC., ("EP") a Utah Limited Liability Company, Ke1Ty Posey and Bobbie Posey, (''Poseys") 
individuals, with reference to the following facts: 
1. All capitalized terms not defined in this Amendment will have the meaning 
ascribed to them in that certain "Operating Agreement for Tivoli Gardens, LLC" by and between 
PEGI and VSI dated as of August 15, 2007 (the "Agreement"). 
A. The parties formed Tivoli Properties, LLC, a limited liability company organized 
under the laws of the State of Utah (the "Company"), and in connection therewith the patties 
have entered into the Agreement. 
B. The parties desire to adopt and approve the following provisions shall replace 
Sections 2.5, 3.1.l. 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 and incorporate them into the Agreement, effective as of the 
Effective Date. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual agreements 
contained herein, and intending to be legally bound, the parties agree as follows: 
I. Amendment to Agreement. Upon execution of this Amendment, the Agreement will be 
amended by replacing and inserting the following new provision as Section 3.1.1 thereof: 
"3.1.1 Contribution from Equity Partners. Equity ParttJers shall contribute and assign to 
the Company all of Equity Partners' right, title, and interest as buyer in, to, and under the 
Purchase Agreement and the Company shall assume and shall perform all of Equity Partners 
obligations as buyer thereunder. Furthermore, £quit}' Partners ·will arrange for, sign and 
guarantee an interim loan in the amount of Seven Hundred•Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($750,000.00) which v.,i/l be used as operating capita/for the Company. Additionally, all 
amounts paid by Equity Partners pursuant to the entirlement process. Purchase Agreement or 
otherwise related to the acquisition and development of the Property. whether paid prior 10 or 
after the execurion of rhis Agreement, shall be deemed to be capital contributions made. to the 
Company by Equity Partners. As of the dare of this Agreement. rhe aggregate amount of such 
deemed capital conrriburion made by Equity Partners to the Company $800,000.00. Once the 
Loan is obtained, Equity Partners shall set aside and pay $10,000.00 per n·wnth ro the Sellers 
from the operating capital of the Company. As a result of such contribwion, Equity Partners has 
been credited \.l-'ith a capital account equal to $800.000.00, and has received 800.000 Class A 
Units." 
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2. Section 3.1.2 shall be amended by replacing and inserting the following new provision 
as Section 3.1.2 thereof: 
"3.1.2 Contribution from Kerry R. Posey. Kerry R. Posey shall contribute the carrying costs of 
his subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One Hundred 
Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($175.000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the 
Company by Kerry R. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Kerry R. Posey has been credited 
with a capital account equal to $125,000.00. and has received 100,000 Class A Units and 25,000 
Class B Units. " 
3. Section 3.1.3 shall be amended by replacing and inserting the following new provision 
as Section 3.1.2 thereof: 
"3.1.3 Contribution from Bobbie M. Posey. Bobbie M .. Posey shall contribute rhe canying 
costs of her subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One 
Hundred Seventy-five 1110usand Dollars ($175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions 
made to the Company by Bobbie M. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Bobbie M. Posey 
has been credited with a capital accouJtt equal to $125,000.00, and has received 100,000 Cl<t,·s 
A Units and 25,000 Class B Units." 
4. Section 2.5 shall be amended by replacing and inserting the following new provision 
as Section 2.5 thereof: 
2.5. Fiscal year, accounting. The Company's.fiscal year shall be the calendar year. the 
particular accounting methods and principals to be followed by the Company shall be selected 
by the accountant for the Company ("Accountant") who is hereby designated as Dallas Cooke, 
CPA as the independent CPA finn. The CPA Accountant may be changed by wrillen Notice of 
the then serving Manager, consemed to in writing by at least Two (2) Members. 
5. Other Terms. Except as otherwise provided herein, all other terms and conditions of 
the Agreement will remain in full force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused their duly authorized officers to 
execute this Amendment, effective as of the Effectiv~W- J1f!2., 
EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC. By: /s/ Allan Bruun --1-Q!J_....p.,L_W ___ p __ ~ _____ Title: 
Memb~ ' 
.:l 
KERRY R. POSEY. By: Isl Kerry R. Posey ,£('7} £ J-"d2~ 
Individual 
BOBBIE M. POSEY, By: Isl Bobbie M. Posey ~lf.u, f ~ 
Individual 
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THE MEMBERSHIP INTERESTS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THIS 
AGREEMENT MAY UNDER FEDERAL LAWS AND THE LAWS OF VARIOUS 
STATES BE CONSIDERED SECURITIES. IN THAT LIGHT. THE MEMBERSHIP 
INTERESTS (A) HA VE NOT BEEN REGISTERED OR QUALIFIED UNDER THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. AS AMENDED, OR UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF 
ANY STATE, AND WILL BE OFFERED AND SOLD IN RELIANCE ON EXEMPTIONS 
FROM THE REGISTRATION REQUIRElvtENTS OF THESE LAWS BY VIRTUE OF 
THE COMPANY'S INTENDED COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 4(2) OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. AS AMENDED. THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION D 
UNDER SUCH ACT. AND SIMILAR EXEMPTIONS UNDER STATE LAW; (8) MAY 
BE PURCHASED FOR INVESTMENT ONLY; AND (C) MAY NOT BE SOLD. 
OFFERED FOR SALE. PLEDGED. OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF (1) UNLESS SO 
REGISTERED OR QUALIFIED OR UNLESS AN EXEMPTION FROM THE 
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF SUCH ACTS APPLIES TO SUCH 
DISPOSITION. THE AVAILABILITY OF WHICH IS ESTABLISHED BY AN OPINION 
OF COUNSEL. WHICH OPINION AND COUNSEL ARE REASONABLY 
SATISFACTORY TO THE MANAGER, AND (2) UNLESS THE PROVISIONS OF 
ARTICLE 6 OF THIS OPERATING AGREEMENT RELATED THERETO ARE 
SATISfIED. ACCORDINGLY. HOLDERS OF THESE MEMBERSHlP INTERESTS 
INDEFINITE PERIOD. THE SECURITIES HA VE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR 
DISAPPROVED BY ANY REGULATORY AUTHORITY. ANY REPRESENTATION 
TO THE CONTRARY IS UNLAWFUL. 
0000276 
lDW Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab E 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. ·: . I 
~ DISTRICT COURT OPENING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE,d Judlclal District 
INTRODUCTION: NOV 1 4 2013 
SALTUKE COUNTY. 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, you have been selected ftit1 sWom as me JUI}'EIQnb~lerk 
case. The defendant is accused of committing certain crimes. You will decide if the defendant 
is guilty or not guilty. I will give you some instructions now and some later. You are required 
to consider and follow all my instructions. Keep an open mind throughout the trial. At the end 
of the trial you will discuss the evidence and reach a verdict. You took an oath to "well and 
truly try the ~ssues pending between the parties" and to "render _a true and just verdict" The oath 
is your promise to do your duty as a member of the jury. Please be alert, pay attention and 
follow all my instructions: 
INFORMATION, PLEA AND BURDEN OF PROOF: 
The prosecution has filed a document - called an "Information" - that contains ihe 
charges against the defendant The Information is not evidence of anything. It is only a 
method of accusing a defendant of the crimes. The Information will now be reaci. 
(Read the Information) 
The defendant has entered pleas of not guilty and denies committing the crimes. Every . 
crime has component parts called "elements". The prosecution must prove each and every 
element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt Until the prosecution has satisfied that 
burden, you must presume that the defendant is not guilty. The defendant does not have to 
prove anything. He/she does not have to testify, call witnesses, or present evidence. 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: 
Remember, the fact that the defendant is charged with the crimes is n~t evidence of guilt. 
The law presumes that the defendant is n<?t guilty of the crimes charged. This presumption 
persists unless the prosecution's_evidence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is guilty. 
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ROLE OF THE JUDGE, JURY AND LA WYERS: 
All of us, judge, jury and lawyers, are officers of the court and have different roles during 
the trial: 
* 
* 
• 
As the judge I will supervise the trial, decide legal issues, and instruct you on the 
law. 
As the jury, you must follow the law as you weigh the evidence and decide the 
factual issues. Factual issues relate to what did, or did not, happen in this case. 
The lawyers will present evidence and try to persuade you to decide the case one 
way or the other. 
Neither the lawyers nor I decide the case. That is your role. Do not be influenced by 
what you think our opinions might be. Make your decision based on the law given in _my· 
instructions and on the evidence presented in court. , 
NOTE-TAIONG: 
Feel free to t.akes notes during the trial to help you remember the evidence but let me 
give you the following caution: 
* 
* 
Do not let note-taking distract you from the proceedings or cause you to miss 
testimony presented. 
You should not view your notes as authoritative record of the evidence presented. 
Your notes are not evidence and may be incomplete. Your memory should be 
your greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate. 
ORDER OF THE TRIAL: 
I will now explain to you how the trial will unfold. The prosecution will give its 
opening statement. An opening statem~nt gives an overview of the case from one point of view, 
and summarizes what that lawyer thinks the evidence will show. Defense counsel may choose 
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to make an opening statement right after the prosecutor, or wait until after all the prosecution's 
evidence has been presented, or not make one at all. Next, you will the hear the prosecution's 
evidence. Evidence is usually presented by calling and questioning witnesses. What the 
witnesses say is testimony. A witness is questioned first by the lawyer who called that witness. 
This is called direct examination. After direct examination, the witness will be questioned by 
the opposing lawyer. This is called cross-examination. 
Consider all testimony,. whether from direct or cross-examination, regardless of who calls 
the witness. After the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant may present · 
evidence, although the defendant has no duty to _do so. If the defendant does present evidence, 
the prosecution may then present additional evidence. After both sides haye presented all their 
evidence, I will give you final instructions on the law you must follow in reaching a verdict 
You will then hear closing arguments from the lawyers. The prosecutor will speak first followed 
by defense counsel. Then prosecutor speaks last because the government has the burden of 
. proof. Finally, you will deliberate in the jwy room. You may take your notes with yplL. You 
will discuss the case and reach a verdict. 
7. CONDUCT OF JURORS: 
From time to time I will call a recess. It may be for a few minutes or longer. During 
recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone- not family, not fiiends, not even each other. 
Until the trial is over, do not mingle or talk with the lawyers, parties, witnesses or anyone else 
connected with the case. You are welcome to talk with other members of the jury panel but do 
not discuss this case, any matters discussed in court, or anyone involved in this case. Our court 
clerks and bailiffs can answer general questions, such as the length of breaks or location of 
restrooms. But they cannot comment about the case or anyone involved in the case. The goal 
is to avoid the impression that anyone is trying to influence you improperly. If people involved 
in the case seem to ignore you outside of court, they are just following this instruction. 
Do not conduct any inaependent research or investigation of any issue involving this 
case. This includes but is not limited to the following: Do hot visit or view any alleged location, 
do not do any research on the internet, do not read any articles, law books, dictionaries or other 
documents other than what is presented to you in court. Do not let anyone else do this for you. 
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Until the trial is over, do not read or listen to any news reports about this case. If you 
observe anytbjng that seems to violate this instruction, report it immediately to a clerk or-bailiff. 
8. FURTHER ADMONITION REGARDING ELECTRONIC DEVICES. 
Serious problems have been caused around the country by jurors using computer and 
electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigat~ a case, or to share 
with others our thoughts about the trial, and it's easy to do so with the internet and instant 
communication devices or services, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so 
on. 
However, please understand that the rules of evidence and procedure have developed 
over hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution C?f disputes. The fairness of the 
entire system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your decisions based on evidence 
presented to you in court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as 
jurors if you conduct your own investigations or communicate about this trial with others:; 
Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling" 
the parties, issues, or counsel; "Twittering"'with fiiends about the trial; using Blackberries or 
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial updates on Facebook pages; using 
Wikipedia or other internet information sources, and so on. Even using something as seemingly 
innocent as "Google Maps" can result in a mistrial. 
Post-trial investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they 
are discovered, they will be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to be retried, 
at substantial cost. 
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror. 
So I must warn you again - do not use your cellphone or computer to investigate or 
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completely finished. Do no internet research 
of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so. 
CONFERENCES WI COUNSEL: 
During the course of this trial, the attorneys and I will often meet before court starts or 
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during the recesses. Sometimes, these meetings will go beyond the time we are scheduled to 
start. I want to assure you, when that happens; we are not being inconsiderate of the 
importance of your time. To the contrary, every conference I have w/ counsel is necessary to 
simplify the issues of the trial, to expedite this case so it may be brought to a timely conclusion 
and most importantly to ensure matters are handled in a fair and just manner. Please accept my 
apologies in advance for any delay that may occur in our starting time. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ro 
CLOSING ROADMAP: 
Members of the jury, you now have all the evidence. Three things remain 
to be done: 
First, I will give you additional instructions that you will follow in deciding 
this case. 
Second, the lawyers will give their closing arguments. The prosecutor will 
go first, then the defense. Because the prosecution has the burden of proof, the 
prosecutor may give a rebuttal argument. 
Finally, you will go to the jury room. to discuss and decide the case. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . ..,.._\ _/ _ 
JUROR DUTIES: 
You have two main duties as jurors. 
The first is to decide from the evidence what the facts are. Deciding what 
the facts.are is your job, not mine. 
The second duty is to take the law I have given you and will now give you in 
th~ instructions, apply it to the facts, and decide if the prosecution has proved the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You are bou_nd by your oath to follow the instructions that I give you, even if 
you personally disagree with them. This includes the instructions I g~ve you 
before the trial, any instructions I may have given to you during the trial, and .these 
instructions I give to you now. All instructions are important, and you shoul4 
consider them as a whole. The order in which the instructions are given does· not 
mean that some instructiops are more important than others. Whether any 
particular instruction applies may depend upon what you decide ~e the true facts 
of the case. If an instruction applies only to facts or circumstances you find do not 
exist, you may disregard that instruction. 
Perform your duties fairly. Do.not let any bias, sympathy or prejudice that 
you may feel toward one side or the other influence your decision in any way. 
You must also not let yourself be influenced by public opinion or what you may 
perceive as public opinion regarding any decision you make. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 2 
EVIDENCE: 
You must base your decision only on the evidence that you saw and heard 
here in court. 
Evidence includes: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
what the witnesses said while they were testifying under oath; 
any exhibits admitted into evidence; 
any facts to which the parties stipulated, that is to say, facts to which 
they agreed; 
any facts of which I took asjudici~ notice and told you to accept as 
true. 
{ 
Nothing else is evidence. The lawyers' statements and arguments are not 
evidence. Their objections are not evidence. My legal rulings and comments, if 
any, are not evidence. · 
In reaching a verdict, consider all the evidence as I have defined it here, and 
nothing else. You may also draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence . 
... 
. ·-
I r·: 
' t·' ,,. 
!-~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \3 
DIRECT AND/OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: 
Facts.may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The law does not 
treat one type of evidence as better than the other. 
Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. It usually comes from a witness 
who perceived firsthand the fact in question. For example, if a witness testified he 
looked outside and saw it raining, that would be direct evidence that it.had rained. 
Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence. It usually comes from a · 
witness who perceived a set of related events, but not the fact in question. For 
example, if a witness testified she looked outside and saw the ground was wet and 
people were closing their umbrellas, that would be circumstantial evidence that it 
had rained. · -~ 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge, there must be 
enough evidence - direct, circumstantial, or both - to convince you of the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is up to you to decide. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
LEGAL RULINGS: 
During the trial I have made certaix?. rulings. I made these rulings based on 
the law, and not because I favor one side or the other. 
However, 
* 
* 
* 
if I sustained the objection, 
if I did not accept evidence offered by one side or the other, or 
if I ordered that certain testimony be stricken, 
then you must not consider those things in reaching your verdict. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY: 
As the judge, I am neutral. If I have said or done anything that makes you 
think I favor one side or1he other, that was not my intention. Do not interpret 
anything I have said or done as indicating that I have any particular view of the 
evidence or the decision you should reach. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -J-b--
CLOSING ARGUMENTS: 
When the lawyers give their closing arguments, keep in mind that they are 
advocating .their views of the case. What they say during their closing arguments 
is not evidence. If the lawyers say something about the evidence that conflicts 
with what you remember, you are to rely on your memory of the evidence. If they 
say anything about the law that conflicts with these instructions, you are to rely on 
these instructions. 
, .. , . 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -[I_ 
DO NOT CONSIDER PUNISHMENT: 
~ In making your decision, do not consider what punishment could result from 
a verdict of guilt. Your duty is to decide if the defendant is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Punishment is not relevant to whether the defendant is guilty or 
not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. l ~ 
WI1NESS CREDIBILITY: 
In deciding this case, you will need to decide how believable each witness is. 
Use your judgment and common sense. Let me suggest a few things to think 
about as you weigh each witness's testimony: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
·* 
* 
* 
How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise 
observe what the witness testified about? 
Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this case? 
Does the witness have any connection to the people involved in this 
case? 
Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant the testimony? 
Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not, is ther.e a 
good reason for the inconsistency? If the witness was inconsist~nt, 
was it about something important or unimportant? · 
How believable was the witness's ~estimony in light of other evidence 
presented at trial? 
How believable was the witness's testimony in light of human 
experience? 
Was there anything about the way the witness testified that-made the 
testimony more or less believable? 
In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, you may also consider 
anything else you think is important. 
You do not have to believe everything that a witness said. You may believe 
part and disbelieve the rest. On the other hand, if you are convinced that a witness 
has lied, you may disbelieve anything the witness said. In other words, you may 
believe all, or part, or none of a witness•~ testimony. You may believe many 
witnesses against one or one witness against many. 
In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember that no one's 
memory is perfect. Anyone can make an honest mistake. Honest people may 
remember the same event differently. 
:~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ( 0, 
DEFENDANT TESTIFYING: 
The defendant testified at trial. Another instruction mentions things for you 
to think about in weighing testimony. Consider those same things and any others 
that you think are important in weighing the defendant's testimony. Don't reject 
the defendant's testimony merely because he/she is accused of a crime. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
DEFENDANT NOT TESTIFYING: 
A person accused of a crime may choose whether or not to testify. Do not 
hold that choice against the defendant. Do not try to guess why the defendant 
chose not to testify. Do not consider it in your deliberations. You must decide 
this case only on the basis of the evidence. The defendant does not have to prove 
that he/she is not guilty. The prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt: · 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -i 1 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S TESTIMONY: 
You have heard the testimony of a law enforcement officer. The fact that a 
witness is employed in law enforcement does not mean that his/her testimony 
deserves more or less consideration than that of any other witness. It is up to you 
to give any witness's testimony whatever weight you think it deserves. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
SEPARATE CONSIDERATION OF MULTIPLE CR.Ilv.IBS: 
The defendant has been charged with more than one crime. It is your duty 
to consider each charge separately. For each crime charged, consider all of the 
evidence related to that charge. Decide whether the prosecution has presented 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that crime. Your 
verdict on one charge does not determine your verdict on any other charge. 
f·:::; 
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INSTRUCTION NO. :2,3 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: 
Remember, the fact that the defendant is charged with a crime is not 
evidence of guilt. The law presumes that the defendant is not guilty of the crimes 
charged. This presumption persists unless the prosecution's evidence convinces · 
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . .2!:J_ 
REASONABLE DOUBT: 
As I instructed you before, the prosecution has the burden of proving the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as 
jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a 
fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the State's proof must be 
mor~ powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced 
of the defendant's guilt There are very few things in this world that we lmow 
with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that 
overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, 
you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you 
must find him/her guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possi\)ility 
that the defendant is not guilty, you must give the defendant the benefit of the· 
doubt and find him/her not guilty. 
I 
I~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
OFFENSE REQUIRES CONDUCT AND MENTAL STATE: 
A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless that person's 
conduct is ·prohibited by law, AND at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant 
demonstrated a particular mental state specified by law. 
"Conduct" can mean both an "act" or a failure to act when the law requires a 
person to act An "act" is a voluntary movement of the body and it can include 
speech. 
As to the "mental state" requirement, the prosecution must prove that at the 
time the defendant acted ( or failed to act), he/she did so with a particular mental 
state. For each offense, the law defines what kind of mental state the defendant 
had to have, if any. For some crimes the defendant.must have acted 'interitioJially" 
or "knowingly". For other crimes it is enough that the defendant acted · 
"recklessly", "with criminal negligence" or with some other specified mental state. 
Later, I will instruct you on the specific conduct and mental state that the 
prosecution must prove before the defendant can be found guilty of the crime(s) 
charged. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Qj, 
INFERRING THE REQUIRED MENTAL STATE: 
The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant acted with a particular mental state. 
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state can be proven 
directly, because no one can tell what another person is thinking. 
. A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the surrounding 
facts and circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, what 
the defendant did, and ahy other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's 
mind. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2 7 
MOTIVE: 
A defendant's mental state is not the same as "motive". Motive is why a 
person does something. Motive is not an element of the crime( s) charged in this 
case. As a result, the pr-osecutor does not have to prove why the defendant acted 
(or failed to act). 
However, motive or lack of motive may help you determine if the defendant 
did what he/she is charged with doing. It may also help you determine what 
his/her mental state was at the time. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.. ?s( 
FACT VS. EXPERT WITNESS: 
There are two types of witnesses: fact witnesses and expert witnesses. 
Usually a fact witness can testify only about facts that he/she can see, hear, touch , 
taste or smell. An expert witness has scientific, technical or other special 
knowledge that allows the witness to give an opinion. An expert's knowledge can 
come from training, education, experience or skill. An expert can testify about 
facts, and they can give their opinions in their area of expertise. 
In weighing the opinion of an expert, you may look at their qualifications, 
the reasoning process the expert used, and the overall credibility of their :-
testimony. You may also look at things like bias, consistency, and reputation. 
Use your common sense in evaluating all witnesses including any expert 
witness. You do not have to accept an expert's opinion. You may accept it all, 
reject it all, or accept part and reject part. Give it whatever weight you think it 
deserves. 
I 
I~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -2-Cf.....--
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count One of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1006). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count One of the 
Criminal Information. If you bel.ieve that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count One. 
'100 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 D 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count One of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of 
Utah,· ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
That value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1006). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count One of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count One. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3{ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Two of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the p~rpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1007). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Two of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Two. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 2-
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Two of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1007). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
every one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
shall be your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Two of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Two. 
j.·., 
I 
I~ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
... - ....... 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Three of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1012). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Three of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Three. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3Y 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Three of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3 . 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1012). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Three of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Three. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
... 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Four of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1015). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Four of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Four. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3.£ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Four of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2 • 
3 . 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1015). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Four of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Four. 
U.C.A. §76-6-404 
t·-· 
,~ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
, ....... .. 
INSTRUCTION NO. .'.?7 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Five of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. 
2 • 
Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1016). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Five of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Five. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3~ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Five of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1016). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Five of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Five. 
I~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3"1' 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Six of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
3. 
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is less than $500.00 {Check 
#1017). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Six of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Six. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 46 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Six of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is less than $500.00 (Check 
#1017). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Six of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Six. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _4 __ , _ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Seven of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey} thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1018}. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Seven of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Seven. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. '-:J.~_2,,,.___ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Seven of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1018). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond ·a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Seven of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Seven. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ·-4~::3~-
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Eight of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2 . That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey} thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1019}. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Eight of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Eight. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INSTRUCTION NO. Yl/ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Eight of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1019). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Eight of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged-in Count Eight. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4s 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Nine of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. 
2. 
Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is 
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1021). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Nine of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Nine. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4b 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Nine of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is 
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1021). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Nine of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Nine. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 1 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Ten of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1027). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
· one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Ten of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Ten. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ¼•~ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Ten of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 {Check #1027). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Ten of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Ten. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . ...-a,4-'f--
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twelve of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2 • That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is less than $500.00 (Check 
#1024). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twelve of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twelve. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. {3 Q 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twelve of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 200-S, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3 • 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is less than $500.00 (Check 
#1024). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twelve of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twelve. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. r,{ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Thirteen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is less than $500.00 {Check 
#1025). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Thirteen 
of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence 
has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant 
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Thirteen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5 2.. 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Thirteen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is less than $500.00 (Check 
#1025). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Thirteen of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Thirteen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ,53 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Fifteen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. 
2. 
Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1029). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Fifteen of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Fifteen. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.···;,---. 
\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. ,5,_4 __ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Fifteen of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2 . That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1029). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Fifteen of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Fifteen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 55 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Sixteen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is 
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1030). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Sixteen of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Sixteen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . . 5-h 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Sixteen of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is 
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1030). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Sixteen of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Sixteen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 57 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Seventeen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. 
3 . 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1034). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Seventeen 
of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence 
has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant 
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Seventeen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5<?: 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Seventeen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1034). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Seventeen of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Seventeen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5'1 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Eighteen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1035). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Eighteen 
of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence 
has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant 
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Eighteen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~tK...Ja __ _ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Eighteen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
{Check #1035) . 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Eighteen of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Eighteen. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Nineteen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about February 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1041). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Nineteen 
of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence 
has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant 
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Nineteen. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6 2 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Nineteen of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about February 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1041}. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Nineteen of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Nineteen. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about February 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1042) . 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALL.AN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty of the Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the 
following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about February 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1042). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty of the 
Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6£ 
In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-One of 
the Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence 
presented all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about March 2oo"a, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1047). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-One 
of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence 
has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant 
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-One. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. b b 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-One of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about March 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1047) . 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-One of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-One. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Two of 
the Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence 
presented all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about March 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1098). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-Two 
of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence 
has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant 
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Two. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-··" 
\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 68: 
In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Two of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about March 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 {Check #1098). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Two of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Two. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Three of 
the Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence 
presented all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1049). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-
Three of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the 
evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find 
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-
Three. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Three of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2 . 
3 . 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1049). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Three of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Three. 
~.• 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Four of 
the Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence 
presented all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1051). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-
Four of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the 
evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find 
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-
Four. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Four of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2 . 
3. 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1051). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Four of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Four. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Five of 
the Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence 
presented all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about May 2008, in the State of Utah, 
JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1055). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-
Five of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the 
evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find 
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-
Five. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Five of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3 • The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00 
(Check #1055). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Five of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Five. 
!·• 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Six of 
the Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence 
presented all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Commencing on or about May 2008, in the State of Utah, 
JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1062). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-Six 
of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence 
has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant 
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Six. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Six of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about May 2008, in the State of Utah, 
ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized control 
over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but 
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1062). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Six of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Six. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Seven of 
the Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence 
presented all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about June 2008, in the State of Utah, 
JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is 
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1066). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-
Seven of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the 
evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find 
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-
Seven. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Seven of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about June 2008, in the State of Utah, 
ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized control 
over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is 
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1066). 
· If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Seven of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Seven. 
: I 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Eight of 
the Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence 
presented all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about September 2008, in the State of 
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is 
less than $1,500.00 {Check #1070). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-
Eight of the Criminal Information. If you believe that the 
evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find 
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-
Eight. 
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty 
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Eight of the 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented 
all of the following evidence of the crime: 
1. Commencing on or about September 2008, in the State of 
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another; 
2. That he did so with the purpose to deprive another 
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof; 
3. The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is 
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1070). 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Eight of 
the Criminal Information. If you believe that the evidence has 
failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Eight. 
i 
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Before you can find the defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, guilty 
of the crime of PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY as alleged in Count 
Twenty-Nine of the Criminal Information, you must find from the 
evidence all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. From on or about May 2007, in the State of Utah; 
2. James Diderickson; 
3. Purposefully; 
4. Through a pattern of unlawful activity; 
a. in which James Diderickson participated as a 
principal; 
i. received any proceeds directly or indirectly; 
AND 
ii. used or invested, directly or indirectly, any 
part of the income or proceeds of the income, 
which he received from the specified unlawful 
activity to acquire, establish or operate an 
enterprise; OR, 
b. acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of an enterprise; OR, 
c was employed by or associated with any enterprise 
and conducted or participated, directly or 
indirectly, in the conducting of that enterprise's 
affairs; 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant JAMES 
DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-Nine of the Criminal 
Information. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to 
establish one or more of the above elements of the offense 
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find 
the defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-
Nine. 
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Before you can find the defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty of 
the crime of PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY as alleged in Count 
Twenty-Nine of the Criminal Information, you must find from the 
evidence all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. From on or about May 2007, in the State of Utah; 
2. Allan Bruun; 
3. Purposefully; 
4. Through a pattern of unlawful activity; 
a. in which Allan Bruun participated as a principal; 
i. received any proceeds directly or indirectly; 
AND 
b. 
ii. used or invested, directly or indirectly, any 
part of the income or proceeds of the income, 
which he received from the specified unlawful 
activity to acquire, establish or operate an 
enterprise; OR, 
acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of an enterprise; OR, 
c was employed by or associated with any enterprise 
and conducted or participated, directly or 
indirectly, in the conducting of that enterprise's 
affairs; 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant ALLAN BRUUN 
guilty as to Count Twenty-Nine of the Criminal Information. On 
the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or 
more of the above elements of the offense charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the defendant not 
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Nine. 
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You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah, 
the following words have the following meanings: 
1. "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, 
partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associatd in 
fact although not a legal entity, and includes illegal as well as 
legal entitites. 
2 "Pattern of Unlawful Activity" means engaging in 
conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three 
episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated, 
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, 
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated 
by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes 
shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related 
either to each other or to the enterprise. The most recent act 
constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activity as defined 
shall have occurred within 5 years of the commission of the next 
preceeding act alleged as part of the pattern. 
3. "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of 
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, including 
state, county, and local governmental entities. 
4. "Entity" includes a domestic and foreign corporation, a 
nonprofit corporation, a limited liability company, a profit or 
non-profit unincorporated association, a business trust, an 
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estate, a partnership, a trust, two or more persons having a 
joint or common economic interest. 
5. "Unlawful Activity" means to directly engage in conduct 
or to solicit, request, command, encourage or intentionally aid 
another person to engage in conduct which would constitute an act 
of Theft, as defined in Counts 1 through 10, 12 through 13, and 
15 through 28 above, or to attempt or conspire to engage in an 
act which would constitute that offense, regardless of whether 
the act is in fact charged or indicted by any authority. 
: ~ 
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You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah 
a person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense 
which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on 
behalf of a corporation or association to the same extent as if 
such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf. 
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You are instructed that "purpose to deprive" means to have 
the conscious object: 
a. To withhold property permanently or for so extended a 
period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial 
portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, 
would be lost; or, 
b. To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or 
other compensation; or, 
c. To dispose of the property under circumstances that make 
it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
You are instructed that "purpose to deprive" may be inferred 
from actions and surrounding circumstances and may be found at 
any time in which an actor exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another. 
You are instructed that "obtain" means in relation to 
property ... 11 to bring about a transfer of possession or of some 
other legally recognized interest in property, whether to the 
obtainer or to another ... " 
You are instructed that "property of another" can include 
property of a limited liability corporation. 
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You are inctructed that it is not a defense that an actor 
has an interest in the property obtained, if another person also 
has an interest that actor is not entitled to infringe. 
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You are instructed that if one misappropriates and converts 
to his own use money or property belonging to another under 
circumstances that constitute theft, it is not made otherwise 
because the one doing so might have some intention of restoring 
the loss sometime. And such an act is not prevented from being 
theft merely because the actor says that he or she had such an 
intention . 
. · .,,;·:-···· 
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JURY DELIBERATIONS: 
When you go into the jury room to deliberate, discuss the evidence and 
speak your minds to each other. Open discussion should help you reach a 
unanimous agreement on a verdict. Listen carefully and respectfully to each 
other's views and keep an open mind about what others have to say. I recommend 
that you not commit yourselves to a particular verdict before discussing all the 
evidence. 
Try to reach unanimous agreement, but only if you can do so honestly and in 
good conscience. If there is a difference of opinion about the evidence or the 
verdict, do not hesitate to change your mind if you become convinced that your 
position is wrong. On the other hand, do not give up your honestly held views 
about the evidence simply to agree on a verdict, to give in to pressure froni otµer 
jurors, or just to get the case over with. In the end your vote must be your own. 
Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must agree with the 
verdict before the defendant can be .found "guilty" or "not guilty". In reaching 
your verdict you may not use methods of chance, such as drawing straws or 
flipping a GOin. Rather, the verdict must reflect your individual, careful, and 
conscientious judgment as to whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor 
proved each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 
~loo 
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· FOREPERSON SELECTION AND DUTIES: 
Among the first things you should do when you go to the jury room to 
deliberate is to appoint someone to serve as the jury foreperson. The foreperson 
should not dominate the jury discussion, but rather should facilitate the discussion 
of the evidence and make sure that all ·members of the jwy get a chance to speak. 
The foreperson's opinions should be given the same weight as those of other 
members of the jury. Once the jury has reached a unanimous verdict, the 
foreperson is responsible for filling out and signing the verdict form(s) on behalf of 
the entire juzy. 
For each charge the verdict form will have two blan1cs- one for "guilty" and 
the other for "not guilty". The foreperson will fill in the appropriate blank to . 
reflect the jury's unanimous decision. In filling out the form, the foreperson p.eecls 
to make sure that only one blank is marked for each charge. When your verdlct(s) 
has/have been found, please notify the bailiff. 
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SETTLEiVIENT AGREEJ.\tIENT AL'lD RELEASE 
TIIlS SETTLElvIENT AGREENIBNT AND RELEASE ("Settlement Agreement") is made and 
entered into by and among Kerry Posey and Bobbie Posey, individuals (the ''Poseys"); Equity Partners1 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and Four Winds Dev~lopment Group, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, as the sole member and manager of Equity Partners, LLC (collectively referred to as 
''Equity Partners"); Four Winds Development Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, James 
Didericksen, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC, 
Allan Bruun, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC, 
and Guy Anderson, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, 
LLC ( collectively referred to as "Four Winds11); and Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, Equity Partners, LLC, as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, Kerry Posey, as a member of 
Tivoli Prope!fies, LLC, Bobbie Posey as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, and Vladamir Canro, as 
an individual and as the manager ofTivoli Properties, LLC (collectively referred to as "Tivoli''); and 
collectively referred to as the '~Parties." 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, up to the fall of 2007, the Poseys owned approximately thirty acres of real property 
located at 7916 North 10800 West, Saratoga Springs, Utah, 84045, and more particularly described in 
the legal descrip~ons attached hereto as Exhibit A (the 'cproperty''); and 
WHEREAS, as members of a newly created Utah limited liability company {Tivoli Properties, 
LLC), the Poseys and Equity Partners entered into an agreement to develop the Property for the 
anticipated mutual benefit of the Poseys and Equity Partners; and 
WHEREAS, at a real estate closing held on or about November 16, 2007, in exchange for a cash 
payment and the agreement of Equity Partners to provide the Poseys with a third lien position in the 
Property, the Poseys conveyed title to the Property to Equity Partners, LLC; and 
WHEREAS, due to declining real estate and financial markets, and also due to growing distrust, 
dissatisfaction and disappointment between the Parties, the Parties have chosen now to part ways, and 
by this Settlement Agreement have arrived at what each believes to be an agreeable resolution and 
settlement of all claims, disputes and defenses the Parties have or may have with respect to each other. 
NOW THEREFORE, in order to memorialize their resolution and settlement, the Parties hereby 
enter into this following Settlement Agreement upon the following terms: 
TERl\tfS 
l. Settlement Payment: Equity Partners shall receive a lump sum Settlement Payment in the 
amount of Twenty Five Thousand dollars ($25,000.00). The Settlement Payment shall be made as a 
transfer from Premier Title Company's escrow account to an account, or accounts, designated by Equity 
Partners within forty-eight hours after the execution of this Settlement Agreement 
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2. Transfer of Propertv: Equity Partners shall execute a Quit Claim Deed in favor of the Poseys, 
as Grantees, for the Property. The Quit Claim Deed descn'bed in this paragraph has been approved by 
the Poseys, and is cUITeotly being held by Premier Title Company. The Quit Claim Deed will be 
recorded by Premier Title Company within forty eight•hours after the execution of this Settlement 
Agreement. 
3. Release of Claims and Liabilitv: The Parties mutually release, cancel, forgive and forever 
discharge each other, and each of their predecessors, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates and divisions, and 
all of their officers, members, directors and employees from all actions, claims, demands, damages, 
obligations, liabilities, controversies and executions, of any kind or nature whatsoever, whether known 
or unknown, which have arisen, or which may have arisen, or which may arise by reason of money 
received, management of funds, management actions or payments made, as designated and descn'bed in 
the Tivoli Properties, LLC, Operating Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Agreement associated 
with the Property, as managers1 buyers, sellers, consultants,.agents, employees, representatives, owners, 
members, affiliates, contractors, associates, or any other affiliated operative from the first day of the 
world, including this day and each day hereafter. This release of claims includes, but is not limited to, 
the paymen1s to and receipts by the persons and entities identified on the schedule of Questioned 
Payments attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
4. Global /Comprehensive Release: The Parties specifically waive any claim or right to assert 
any cause of action or alleged case of action which bas, through oversight or error, intentionally or 
unintentionally, and whether by mutual or unilateral mistake, been omitted from this Settlement 
Agreement 
5. A!!'reement to Execute Additional Documents to Carry Out Settlement: The Parties 
will execute any and all other documents as reasonably necessary to implement the terms and effecting 
the purposes of this Settlement Agreement. 
6. Pavment of Attornevs' Fees and Costs: Each Party is responsible for his/her/its own 
attorneys' fees and costs associated with resolution of the issues and transactions to which this 
Settlement Agreement pertains, including but not limited to negotiating, drafting and entering into this 
Settlement Agreement, and for any subsequent documents and actions necessary and appropriate for 
implementing the terms and effecting the purposes of this Settlement Agreement. 
7. Confidentialitv: Except as necessary to the conduct or protection of their legitimate business 
interests or as may be required by operation of law or order of court, the Parties covenant to hold the 
terms, conditions and performance of this Settlement Agreement in confidence and to refrain from 
discussing their dispute or its resolution with other persons not a party to this Settlement Agreement, 
except as necessary or appropriate with their legal and financial professionals. 
8. No Actual or Implied Admission: This Settlement Agreement is not to be construed as an 
admission or acknowledgment of any wrongdoing, fault or liability by any Party to any other Party, or to 
any third person or entity not party to this Settlement Agreement; and each Party hereby expressly 
denies any such wrongdoing, fault or liability. 
2 
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9. Severabilitv: If any provision of this Settlement Agreement or the application thereof 
to any person, entity, or circumstance shall, for any reason and to any extent, be found invalid or 
unenforceable, neither the remainder of this Settlement Agreement nor the application of such provision 
to any other person, entity, or circumstance shall be affected thereby= but rather shall be enforced to the 
greatest extent possible. 
10. Default and Attomevs' Fees and Costs: In the event of breach or default hereunder, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other party all expenses, costs, and attorneys' 
fees incurred in connection with determining, protecting or enforcing their rights, including lay and 
expert witness fees, whether such expenses would be recoverable as costs and attorneys' fees in the 
original action or not 
11. Jurisdiction. Venue. and Governing: law: Jurisdiction and Venue shall exist only in 
the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State ofUtah for any action in regard ta this Settlement 
Agreement. This Settlement Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
12. Entire A!lreement: This Settlement Agreement sets forth the entire Settlement 
Agreement of the Parties in the settlement of their respective differences. No provision of this 
Settlement Agreement may be amended or any right hereto modified or waived except by a written 
agreement executed by the Parties. 
13. Cooperation in Draftine: the Settlement Aereement: Each Party hereto has 
cooperated in establishing the terms of this Settlement Agreement as well as drafting the recitals and 
terms of this Settlement Agreement Therefore, if any construction or interpretation is to be made 
regarding this Settlement Agreement or any of its Recitals or Terms, the same shall not be 
presumptively construed against any Party. 
14. Counterparts: This Settlement Agreement may be executed in any number of 
counterparts, each of which when so executed shall be deemed to be an original, and all of which when 
taken together shall constitute one and the same document 
15. Successors and AssifZDs: This Settlement Agreement is binding upon the Parties, 
their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, and will inure to the benefit of the 
Parties, their heirs, executors, ad.mirustrators, successors, and assigns. 
16. Authority to Execute This A£Zreement: Each Party to this Settlement Agreement 
hereby represents and warrants to each other Party that he/she/it has the authority and/or has been duly 
authorized to execute, be bound to, and deliver this Settlement Agreement. 
17. Acknowled2ement: The Parties declare that each has read and understands this Settlement 
Agreement. The Parties have executed this Settlement Agreement voluntarily and without being unduly 
pressured, under duress or influenced by any statement or representation made by any other Party or by 
any person acting on behalf of any other Party, including their counsel. In negotiating, drafting and 
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entering into this Agreement, the Parties also acknowledge that they have either been represented, or 
have had an opportunity to be represented, by and/or consult with independent counsel of their own 
choosing. 
Dated: L;,/; I /tJ e 
EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC 
A UT AH LilvIITED LIABILITY C01'IP ANY 
B~-~-~~~~~~~1.ca~~--(Na~) ~ , · 
Mdiging Member of Four Winds 
Development Group, LLC, its sole member 
and manager 
Dated; _____ I I_-_L __ !-_a_& __ _ 
Dated: // /11 /o 3 
--.........,.,------,-----
FOUR W1NDS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC 
A UTAHLL.vIITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
By: <aa ~ef 
Guy Anderson I 
Its: Managing Member 
Dated: I I /4 /oe; 
' . 
FOUR WlNDS DEVELOP:MENT GROUP, LLC FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC 
A UT AH LilvfITED LIABILITY COMP ANY A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMP ANY 
By: If&~ 
Allan Bruun 
Its; Managing Member 
TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC 
A UT AH Lil.\,fITED LIAB IT 
0 • g Member of Four Winds 
Development Group, LLC, the sole member 
and manager of Equity Partners, LLC, its 
member 
I 
Dated: 11 I, 2 lo~ 
---7--,------
TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC 
A UTAH LL\1ITED LIABil.,lTY COMPANY 
By. /Y P~ 
• ~~d ~
KerryP~y 
Its: Member 
Second Signature Page of Settlement Agreement 011 Folio-wing Page 
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Second Signatzwe Page of Settlement Agreement 
Dated: _ __._l_/-_l.,;;_;l_-~/)...:.:.f ___ _ 
TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC 
A UTAH LlNilTED LIABILITY CO~IPANY 
By: &£.v tlkaw 
Bobbie Posey ~ 
·Its: Member (/ 
Dated: // - / ;;i - I) <j 
Br.✓~~~ KenyPo 
As an individual 
Dated:/~¥~ 
Dated: //////ere 
----.::;.......,~..:.._..,.:;--=-=-----
Dated: //- il- 08 
TNOLIPROPERTIES,LLC 
A UTAH LMTED LIABILITY COlvfPANY 
By: .,,i!zffe4 ,/Z? _J2}J}. 
Vladamir Canro 
Its: Manager 
Dated: _ _...:..:.,I /_-.,_;ltP.=----=0--='8:;..__ _ 
By: &dr~ 11?/J<VIT 
Bobbie Posey 
As an individual 
Datcd: __ //_-_(/_-_cf3 _ _ 
By: dit~ 
Allan Bruun 
As an individual 
Dated: fl- J)...- o~ 
By:~ 
Guy Anders 
,,::;{__--L--. By: fbo-, .o .__,Q? .f) ' 
As an individual 
5 
Vlacfirfnir Canro 
As an individual 
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RELEASE OF PERSO;\;AL GL:.\ .. RA ... ~TY 
This Rei ease o: Per~onul Guaranty is made this_ day of November: 2008 
Whereas~ on or about November 20 2007, Equity Par:ners: LLC exe=uted a J 51 Lien 
Position Secured Promissory Noce C'Note'~j in rhe amount of $750:000.00; 
Whereas: Guy Anderson: AJian Brnun and James D. Dideridcsen cad1 execuced th:! 
aforementioned Note Ds pe.sona; g?Jarantors for the same. 
Whereas:- Equity Pa.'1:ners: LLC has agreec lo release the property which acts as securi!}: 
for the pmmi5.sory note and to convey the same to Kerry and Bobbi:! Posey in exchange 
for d1e release of the personnl guaranties described a:>ove and the payment of $25-,000.00~ 
and 
\Vhereas Dry Creek S~uctures: LLC is the curren: hoider of the Note. 
NOW THEREFORE: in exchange for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and vaiuable 
consideration: Dry Creek Structures, LLC hereby releeses the personal guar~,tie~ of the 
1st Lien Position Secured Promissory Note provided by Guy Anderson: Alhm Brum: and 
James D. Didericlcsen. AH remaining terms and conditions of the Note shall re:r.ain in 
full force and effect 
EXCUTED on the dates subscribed above. 
DR~Il::~ucTIJR.S 'LLC 
I-~ 
By(-· '\ 
Its:. ___________ _ 
-
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EXIDBIT "A'' 
(Legal_ Description) 
Parcel 1: 
Commencing at a point located South 867.08 feet and East 56.12 feet from the North quarter comer of 
Section 23, Township 5 South, Range 1 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees 
56' 3211 East along an existing fence line 392.28 feet; South 89 degrees S7'57" East along an existing 
fence line 753.09 feet; thence South 197.62 feet; thence South 89 degrees 49'19" West partially along a 
fence line and fence line extension 1145.68 feet; thence North 00 degrees 05'14'' East along East right of 
way line of Redwood Road 201.24 feet to point of beginning. 
Tax Serial No.: 58-035-0029 
Parcel 2: 
Commencing East along Section line 60.69 feet and South 867.58 feet from the North quarter comer of 
Section 23, Township 5 South, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence East2853.03 feet; 
thence South 42 degrees 41 • West 667.20 feet to a fence; thence North 89 degrees 4T West along said 
fence line 2404.35 feet to a fence intersection; thence North 26' East along fence line 481.46 feet to the 
beginning, . 
and excluding the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Commencing at apoint located South 867.08 feet East 56.12 feet from the North quarter comer of 
Section 23, Township S South, Range I West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees 
56932" East along an existing fence line 39228 feet; thence South 89 degrees 57'51" East along an 
existing fence line 753.09 feet; thence South 197.62 feet; thence South 89 degrees 49'19" West partially 
along a fence line and fence line extension 1145.68 feet; thence North 00 degrees 05'14" East along East 
Right of Way line of Redwood Road 201.24 feet to point of beginning. 
·Tax Serial No.: 58-035-0030 
~OD 
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Unexplained Payments 
:~ 
Related Entities Check Number(s) Amount 
1004, 1008, 1021, 1024, 
Four Winds Development 1027, 1034, 1042, 1049, $47.500.00 
1055 
Granite Builders 1007, 1018, 1023, 1028, $58,240.00 1047, 
Geosystems 1016, 1029 $7,975.00 
U.S. General Construction 1019 $100,000.00 
Construction Advisors 1062, 1066 $6!000.00 
TOTAL: $219,715.00 
Related Persons Check Number(s) Amount 
Guy Anderson 1001 $1,014.38 
Jim Didericksen 1006, 1035 $7,151.50 
Dustin Didericksen 1030 isoo.oo 
TOTAL: $8,665.88 
Other Check Number(s) Amount 
Cash Counter Check $100.00 
Kamatsu Equipment· 1012 $5,300.00 
Moulding & Sons 1015 $4,080.00 
Key Bank 1017 $300.00 
DOPL 1024, 102ts(.f~~v1* $615.00 
GWF Inc. 1098 -• r $4,000.00 
Century 21 Elite 1051 $7,500.00 
Wasatch Trailers 1041 $4!015.52 
TOTAL: $25,910.52 
GRAND TOTAL $254,291.40 
G:\EOSI\OOCS\178l0\0001 \MJ2847 .DOC 
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ADDKNDUM TO SETTLEMENT AGREEl\tIENT AND RELEASE 
TIIlS ADDENDUM TO SETTLElvIENT AGREEMENT A.ND RELEASE 
("Addendum'1 ) is made and entered into by and among Kerry Posey and Bobbie Posey, 
individuals (the "Poseys'1); Equity Partners, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and Four 
Winds Development" Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, as the sole member and 
manager of Equity Partners, LLC (collectiv.ely referred to as '~quity Partncrs11); Four Winds 
Development Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, James Didericksen, as an individual 
and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC, Allan Bruun, as an 
individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC, and Guy 
Anderson, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, 
LLC (collectively referred to as ''Four Winds''); and Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, Equity Partners, LLC as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, Kerry Posey, as 
a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, Bpbbie Posey as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, and 
Vladamir Canro, as an individual and as the manager of Tivoli Properties, LLC (collectively 
referred to as ~'Tivoli"); and collectively referred to as the uParties". 
The purpose for this Addendum is to clarify, amend, revise, and restate portions of the original 
Settlement Agreement and Release executed by the Parties on or about November 12, 2008 (the 
"Agreement''). All capitalized terms used herein, unless otherwise 9efined herein, shall have the 
meanings set forth in the Agreement. 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, the Parties entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release {the 
"Agreement'1) on or about November 12, 2008; and 
WHEREAS, prior to the time of executing the Agreement, Equity Partners had received 
from the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT1 ) the amount of $174,000.00 (the "UDOT 
Payment") and had conveyed to UDOT a portion of the Property (the "UDOT Parce1'1); 
WHEREAS, the Parties desire hereby lo memorialize and fonnalize their agreement that 
upon return by Equity Partners of the $174,000.00 as contemplated herein. all disputes and issues 
between and among the Parties shall be settled and release in accordance with the terms of the 
Agreement as modified and/or enlarged by the tenus of this Addendum. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein cootaine-d and in 
order to further memorialize their reso]ution, settlement, and mut11al releases, the Parties hereby 
enter into this Addendum upon the following terms and conditions: · 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
l. Escrow and Payment of UDOT Pavment: Upon execution of this Agreemen~ 
Equity Partner shall deliver to Premier Title (the uTitlc Company") tl1e amount of $174,000.00 
in cash or certified funds, made payable to Premier Title as escrow agent. 
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2. Release ofUDOT Payment: The Poseys shall be solely responsible to obtain and 
to deliver to the Title Company (a) evidence acceptable to Equity Partners and the Title 
Company that Dry Creek Structures, LLC ("Dry Creekn) is the current holder of all interests 
under the first and second notes and trust deeds affecting the Property1; (b} good and sufficient 
Partial Reconveyances of the UDOT Parcel from the effects of the First and Second Trust 
Deeds, as defmed in Footnote No. I below .. fully authorized by Dry Creek ood executed by the 
Title Company, as Trustee; (c) a written request from the Poseys authorizing the Title 
Company to execute and record a Partial Reconveyaoce of the third trust deed2, fully releasing 
the UDOT Parcel from the effects of the Third Trust Deed, as defined in Footnote No. 2 below; 
and ( d) a Release of Personal Guaranties, fully executed by an authorized Manager or member 
of Dry Creek, fully and unconditionally releasing Guy Anderson, Al1an Bruun, and James D. 
Didericksen from their personal Guaranties associated with the First Note and Second Note. 
Upon receipt by the Title Company of the foregoing, the Title Company shall be authorized and 
directed to disperse the UDOT payment as instructed by written instructions executed by both 
the Poseys lWQ Dry Creek. 
3. Retention of the Settlement Pavment: The Parties acknowledge and agree that 
Equity Partners shall be entitled to retain the $25,000.00 payment received in accordance with 
the Agreement. 
4. Settlement A!!reemeot Tenns Anplicable: Except as clarified, amended, and 
revised herein, all of the terms and conditions contained in the Agreement, including, without 
Hrnitation the provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement, are fully applicable to this 
Addendum and are incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. Representations and Warranties: Equity Partners and Four Winds, and James 
Didericksen, Guy Anderson and Allan Bruun as individuals and as members and managers of 
Four Winds Development Group, LLC, hereby represent and warrant that no other TJDOT 
Right of Way Contracts affecting the Property have been negotiated, signed or consummated 
other than the one referencing Tax ID/Sidwell No:58-035-0030 with signature dates of 
10/24/08, 10/29/08 and 10/31/08 for the Total Selling Price of $174,000 and relating to .59 
acres of the Property. 
6. Counterparts and Execution bv Facsimile or Electronic Transmission: The Parties 
agree that this Addendum may be executed in counterparts, with al1 counterparts, when taken 
together, constituting one and the same instrument. To facilitate the execution and opening of 
escrow on this matter, the Parties agree that this document may become effective upon receipt 
by the Title Company of facsimile or email signatures of the Parties; provided, however, that 
all Parties shall deliver to the Title Company original signatures to this Addendum, mailed to 
the Title Company no later than the ~ate of signing by any such Party. 
1 The firsl nolc ("First Note") is a promissory note in the principal amount of$750,000.00 dilted November 201 
1008. secured by n firsr priority trust deed {che "First Trust Deed") d3ted No,·ember 20, 2007 and recorded in the 
Uu1h County Recorder's Office on November 21, 2007, ns Entry No. l 64448:2007. and the second note (the 
.. Second Note" is a promissory note in the principal amount of l 1,250.00 daled on or nbout November 20, 2007 and 
recorded in the Utilh County Recorder's Office on November 21. 2007,. 3S Enny No. 16449:2007 
:? The third trust deed { .. Third Trust Deed .. ) is that certain Trust Deed dated November 16, 2007, and recorded in the 
Utah County Recorder's Office on November 21. 2007, as EnrryNo. 164450:2007. 
,-·~ 
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i.tiP IN WITh'ESS WHEREOF, the Parties pave executed or caused these presents to be 
executed by their duly authorized officer, member, manager or representative as of the dates set 
forth opposite each signature block or line. 
EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC 
A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMP ANY 
e) :Q.NU~ 
M aging Member of Four Winds 
Development Group, LLC, its sole member 
and manager 
Dated: //frt/°8 
FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT 
GROUP,LLC 
A UT AH Lilv1ITED LIABILITY CO:M:P ANY 
By:tlft~ 
A1lan Bruun 
Its: Managing Member 
Dated: _,11_/t_r_/2_o_S_ 
~, 
TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC 
A UTAH LJMITED LIABILITY CO:MPA.l\ry 
By. .!lf ~ 
(Name) frttlfiO /St2.UA/4/.I 
Managing Member of Four Winds 
Development Group, LLC, the sole member 
And manager of Equity Partners, LLC, its 
Member 
Dated:_j........,.y __2,_~ __ /2)_g-_ 
FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT 
GROUP,LLC 
A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY CO. 
By. 4 aL 
Guy Anderson 
Its: Managing Member 
FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT 
GROUP,LLC 
A UT AH LIM]TED LIAB ITY CO. 
Dated: 11 - /- ?op5{ 
TNOLIPROPERTIES, LLC 
A UT AH LilvllTED LIABILITY CO. 
Br-~£ A,~< 
Ker{y Po y 
Its: Member 
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Second Signature Page of Seltlement Agreement 
Dated: 
---------
TIVOLJPROPERTIES,LLC 
A UTAH LilvIITED LIABILITY C01v1PANY 
Br._r::::.~~::::!:::::::::::..J.!..~~:::::::;~ 
Bobbie Posey 
Its: Member 
Dated: /J. - I - Z &e, ~ 
:~~~=p~ 
As an individual 
Dated: __ /_t/:_z___,,t /_0_<3 __ _ 
' I 
By:~d~ 
GuyAndeon 
As an individual 
Dated: /1 - I/ - o '( 
• 
TIVOLI PROPERTIES~ LLC 
A UTAH LlMITED LIABILITY CO. 
By: &ID,joj}_ 
., 
Vladimir Canro 
Its: Manager 
Dated: _________ _ 
:~~~p~ 
As an individual 
Dated:_/_/_/_£ __ / /4_~-~-
/ I 
By: l1f4i---~ 
Allan Bruun 
As an individual 
Dated: /). - II - o ~ 
By: J?C,vvi /0 4.{1_ 
Vladimir Canro 
As an individual 
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